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Binding Future Selves 
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Courts traditionally treat a person entering an agreement as the 
same person at the time of enforcement notwithstanding the passage of 
time or an intervening change of mind. For certain agreements 
between intimates, however, courts have adopted the novel view that 
the enforcement of a person’s earlier commitment would improperly 
constrain that person’s will rather than serve as an expression of it. 
These cases rest on the assumption that an intervening change has 
created meaningful—and legally significant—differences between the 
later self (at the time of enforcement) and the earlier self (at the time of 
commitment) and that the later self deserves protection from the 
earlier self’s choices.  
This “different selves” rationale has arisen primarily in the 
context of agreements pertaining to matters such as embryo 
disposition, surrogacy, and parentage. Courts and commentators 
appear to believe that the centrality of these types of choices to 
personhood justifies exceptions to general contract principles. But 
even assuming that choices of this sort differ from choices embodied in 
“normal” contracts, the different selves rationale does not provide a 
principled basis for resolving a dispute between the selves; it does not 
explain why a choice central to personhood made at an earlier time is 
less central to that person than a choice made at a later time.  
This Article contributes to the existing literature on several fronts. 
It reveals the increasing adoption by courts of the different selves 
rationale, which, until recently, was thought to be merely theoretical. 
It also exposes the ungrounded assumptions on which the rationale 
rests: that it applies only to a certain set of choices, that it can identify 
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the proper choices to protect, and that it can actually protect those 
choices. Finally, this Article uses the different selves rationale as an 
occasion to examine the role of personal identity in contract law. 
Theories of personal identity emphasize the importance of self-
continuity and future-regarding action, both of which are disserved by 
an approach that prizes a person’s preference at the time of dispute 
rather than her earlier commitment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The law of contracts is not sympathetic to regret. Indeed, the 
enforcement of commitments even after a promisor has come to 
regret her promises has been called “the very essence of contract.”1 
On certain matters of great personal significance, however, courts 
have second-guessed this well-established principle.  
A.Z. v. B.Z., which involved a couple’s fifteen-year saga to 
have biologically related children, exemplifies this departure.2 For 
the first two years of their marriage, the couple experienced 
difficulty conceiving a child, and when the wife conceived, she 
suffered an ectopic pregnancy that necessitated the removal of one 
of her fallopian tubes.3 Eight years passed during which the couple 
participated in a year’s worth of additional fertility treatments 
without success. Eleven years into their marriage, the couple 
turned to Gamete Inter-Fallopian Transfer—the simultaneous 
transfer of removed eggs and sperm into the fallopian tube—but 
this procedure resulted in a second ectopic pregnancy, destroying 
the wife’s remaining fallopian tube.4 Left with few other options, 
the couple decided to pursue parenthood through in vitro 
fertilization.5  
Before the first of their procedures, the fertility clinic presented the 
couple with a form entitled “Consent Form for Freezing 
(Cryopreservation) of Embryos,” on which they were asked to indicate 
the disposition of leftover frozen embryos upon certain listed 
contingencies, including separation or death.6 The form prompted the 
couple to select the options “donated” or “destroyed,” but it also 
provided a blank line on which the couple could specify other 
                                                                                                             
 1. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 
84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1247 (1998). See also Marjorie Maguire Shultz, 
Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. 
REV. 204, 214 (1982) (observing that the “freedom to pursue individualization 
and diversity that characterizes private ordering” involves “yesterday’s legally 
binding private choice . . . overrid[ing] today’s contrary private choice”). 
 2. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1052–53 (Mass. 2000). 
 3. Id. at 1052, 1052 n.6 (explaining that an ectopic pregnancy is one that 
occurs outside the uterus). 
 4. Id. at 1053. 
 5. Id. The in vitro fertilization process includes the extraction of eggs from 
the intended mother, fertilization of eggs in a laboratory, implantation of one or 
more of the resulting embryos, and cryopreservation of any leftover embryos for 
later use. See id.  
 6. Id. at 1053–54. Specifically, the form listed the contingencies of “wife 
or donor reaching normal menopause or age forty-five years; preembryos no 
longer being healthy; one of us dying; [s]hould we become separated;” and 
“[s]hould we both die.” Id. at 1054 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
74 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
preferences.7 For the contingency, “‘[s]hould we become 
separated,’” the wife, in the presence of her husband, wrote that the 
embryos should be “‘return[ed] to [the] wife for implant,’” and she 
and her husband signed the form.8 That first procedure was 
unsuccessful, but the couple tried several more times, with the 
husband signing a blank consent form thereafter and the wife 
filling out the form with identical language regarding their 
preferences in the event of their separation.9 Finally, three years 
later, the wife conceived and gave birth to twins.10 When the 
couple divorced several years after the twins’ birth, the wife sought 
judicial enforcement of the consent form over her husband’s 
objection in order to gain possession of the remaining four 
embryos for her use. The court held that under the circumstances, 
the parties did not enter into a binding agreement.11 Remarkably, 
however, the court stated that “even had the husband and the wife 
entered into an unambiguous agreement between themselves 
regarding the disposition of the frozen preembryos, [the court] 
would not enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to 
become a parent against his or her will.”12 
By basing its decision on a disjunction between the husband’s will 
at the time of the legal dispute and his will memorialized in the earlier 
agreement, the court’s reasoning represents a novel departure from 
conventional contract principles. Contract law usually treats an 
agreement as the relevant manifestation of the will of the contracting 
parties and the resultant source of legal authority.13 In determining the 
                                                                                                             
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1053. 
 11. See id. at 1056–57 (noting that the record did not indicate that the 
parties intended the form to act as a binding agreement between them, as 
opposed to an agreement between them and the clinic; that the form lacked a 
duration provision, leading to the possibility of changed circumstances; and that 
the phrase, “‘[s]hould we become separated,’” did not necessarily apply to a 
divorce proceeding). Other courts, interpreting similar consent forms, have 
concluded that the forms were definite enough to constitute an agreement 
between the spouses. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa 
2003) (treating the consent form as an otherwise binding agreement but 
invalidating it on public policy grounds); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 
(N.Y. 1998) (enforcing a consent form as a binding agreement between the 
spouses). 
 12. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057 (emphasis added). 
 13. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Preface to FAULT IN 
AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW xi (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 2010); 
Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1727 (2008) (observing that contract law may be 
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scope of the parties’ legal obligations, courts look to the parties’ assent 
at the time of the agreement and not afterwards: “The time for 
measuring a ‘meeting of the minds’ is the point of agreement, not 
performance.”14 Along those lines, courts interpret the agreement by 
determining the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract 
was created, not at some other time.15 In short, rights and obligations 
typically arise from a party’s acts at the time of contracting; the law 
regularly allows the contracting self to bind his future self. 
Intervening events, like a key individual’s death or the destruction 
of a specific thing necessary for performance, sometimes excuse 
performance under the doctrine of impracticability.16 But such events 
cannot do so if they were objectively foreseeable at the time of 
contracting.17 The A.Z. court did not rely on the occurrence of 
unforeseen circumstances or mistaken assumptions by the husband 
about the state of affairs. Indeed, it would have been difficult for the 
husband to argue that the couple’s separation was an unforeseen 
circumstance that relieved him of his commitment to surrender the 
frozen embryos to his wife given that the spouses indicated their 
preferences for the disposition of the embryos if that very contingency 
arose.18  
                                                                                                             
 
understood as an “act of self-legislation in which the parties create new legal 
obligations for themselves”). 
 14. Vaughan v. Tetzlaff, 446 A.2d 356, 358 (Vt. 1982). See also Situation 
Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Malouf, Inc., 724 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Mass. 2000) (noting that 
“to create an enforceable contract, there must be agreement between the parties 
on the material terms of that contract, and the parties must have a present 
intention to be bound by that agreement” (emphasis added)). 
 15. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990); 
Evans v. Famous Music Corp., 807 N.E.2d 869, 872 (N.Y. 2004) (“It is well 
settled that our role in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intention of the 
parties at the time they entered into the contract.”); Planters Gin Co. v. Fed. 
Compress & Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tenn. 2002) (“The central 
tenet of contract construction is that the intent of the contracting parties at the 
time of executing the agreement should govern.”). This inquiry is primarily 
objective, focusing on the words and conduct of the parties rather than their 
subjective intentions. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory 
of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 427 
(2000). 
 16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261 (excusing 
performance due to unanticipated impracticability), 265 (excusing performance 
due to unanticipated frustration of purpose) (1981). 
 17. See, e.g., Karl Wendt Farm Equip. Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 931 F.2d 
1112, 1120 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the doctrines of impracticability and 
frustration of purpose are “meant to fairly apportion risks between the parties in 
light of unforeseen circumstances”). 
 18. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Mass. 2000). 
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The A.Z. court’s decision to protect the husband from his 
subsequent, internal change of mind joins several other recent 
cases—involving agreements regarding the use of assisted 
reproductive technologies, parentage, and custody—in which 
courts have acted as if the person who made the promise is 
different in a legally significant way from the person against whom 
it is asserted such that enforcement would now be improper.19 I 
call this novel defense to contract enforcement the “different selves 
rationale.”20  
By questioning the legitimacy of holding a later self to an 
earlier self’s commitments, courts have introduced skepticism about 
personal identity—how different selves connect over time, and 
whether a person remains the same despite inevitable changes that 
unfold21—into the realm of contract law. The acknowledgement of 
temporally different selves has significant implications for contract 
law in that it suggests a potentially potent reason not to hold a party to 
her earlier promises. Even more broadly, it challenges the ability of 
the law in multiple contexts to allocate benefits and impose 
punishment based on past actions. If differences between the selves 
are significant enough to relieve a person from her contractual 
commitments, similar differences may call into question the 
legitimacy of punishment for criminal acts committed by a former 
self. And what justifies paternalistic interventions—like anti-
                                                                                                             
 19. See infra Part I.C. 
 20. As I have noted in previous work, courts historically resisted enforcing 
intimate agreements based on traditional notions of family and gender that have 
begun to sound off-tune to modern ears. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public 
Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159, 177–90 (2013) 
(criticizing a wide range of public policy rationales for non-enforcement). It is 
therefore possible that these courts have merely sought to dress up old public 
policy objections to the enforcement of intimate agreements in a more palatable 
package. It may also be the case that courts are actually uncertain about their 
authority to compel specific performance of acts called for by the agreements. 
See infra note 96 and accompanying text. At the risk of speculating about buried 
motives that will never come to light, see Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing 
Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 
YALE L.J. 1885, 1888 (1998) (“[C]ases unfortunately offer quite limited insight 
into the subjective motivations of their cast of characters.”); it is therefore 
possible that the courts’ motivations reside not only in protecting the parties’ 
later selves from their earlier choices, but also in some other place. But the fact 
remains that courts have at least nominally advanced a novel justification for 
refusing to enforce agreements that deserves examination on its own terms. And 
I will argue that, if anything, a more plausible explanation for the different 
selves rationale is not the desire to disguise old public policies as much as it is 
the courts’ legitimate confusion about the prospect of enforcing personhood-
defining commitments against later selves. Id. See infra Part II.A. 
 21. See infra Part I.A. 
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smoking ordinances—designed to make someone better off in the 
future? To recognize legally significant differences between the 
selves, as the courts adopting the different selves rationale have 
done, is to acknowledge the limits of the law to hold people 
accountable for their actions over time. 
The fact that the different selves rationale has thus far only 
arisen in the context of intimate agreements suggests that the 
personhood-related aspects of the choices at stake, like becoming a 
legal or genetic parent, justify the exceptional treatment of intimate 
agreements.22 The rationale for holding that the earlier self cannot 
bind the later self therefore has its roots in notions about what 
choices are central to personhood. In adopting a rationale that 
justifies non-enforcement based on differences between the selves, 
however, courts confuse questions of personhood with questions of 
personal identity. Questions of connection and persistence between 
past and present selves, which relate to personal identity, are 
conceptually distinct from questions about the centrality of past 
and present choices to the self and how the law should protect 
those choices. 
A quick example illustrates this distinction. Which expression 
of B.Z.’s will regarding use of the cryopreserved embryos is more 
central to personhood: the earlier commitment he made to his wife 
that she could use the embryos if they separated, or his later desire that 
they be destroyed? The different selves rationale does not provide a 
reason to privilege the later preference over the earlier one given that 
the choices at both moments—involving reproduction—seem equally 
central to personhood. Courts embracing the different selves rationale 
clearly believe that the preference at the time of enforcement is the 
party’s “true” preference, making enforcement of the earlier 
preference impermissible. But they offer no theoretical justification for 
this approach. This lack of justification is especially pressing because 
the adoption of an ex post perspective defeats the expectations of one 
of the parties to the agreement and may also limit the ability of all 
others to make important ex ante choices—like becoming parents 
through the use of assisted reproductive technologies—in future 
cases. 
Only a few years before the A.Z. v. B.Z. case, E. Allan 
Farnsworth observed that internal changes almost never persuade 
courts to grant relief from earlier commitments, even when those 
                                                                                                             
 22. The A.Z. court, for example, expressly referred to the choices at issue as 
pertaining to “personal rights of . . . delicate and intimate character.” A.Z., 725 
N.E.2d at 1059 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
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changes make one feel like a different person.23 He spoke too soon. 
The emergence of the different selves rationale poses the vexing 
question whether and in what circumstances differences within the 
same person over time may prevent a person from binding his 
future self. And the different selves rationale answers that at least 
within the context of certain agreements regarding intimate subject 
matter, changes of preference over time can relieve a person of her 
contractual obligations. 
My thesis is that theories of personal identity render the 
different selves rationale incorrect on both counts. In so arguing, I 
provide an extended analysis of the concept of personal identity in 
the contract law context.24 Although the subject of personal 
identity has generated a lively scholarly debate outside the legal 
academy, legal scholars have largely ignored its role in contract 
law. I use existing theories of personal identity to examine and 
resist the assumptions about self-discontinuity raised by the 
different selves rationale. My argument proceeds in three parts. 
In Part I, I document the surprising rise of the different selves 
rationale in the courts and trace its scholarly origins. In Part II, I argue 
both that the different selves rationale is internally inconsistent and 
that it cannot be confined to the intimate context. I show that the 
different selves rationale fundamentally departs from traditional 
assumptions about personal identity by granting people freedom from 
the decisions of previous selves and privileging current preferences 
without substantial justification. I also point out the absence of 
justifications for treating decisions related to intimate subject matter 
differently from other commitments reflected in binding agreements. 
In Part III, I demonstrate how theories of personal identity 
undermine the assumptions on which the different selves rationale 
rests. Proponents of the different selves rationale have expressed 
skepticism regarding people’s ability to identify with their previous 
choices and assimilate the choices into a broader understanding of 
their lives. This skepticism, I argue, raises concerns addressed by 
narrative identity theory, which suggests that a person can integrate a 
wide range of experiences into a self-narrative that provides both 
coherence and persistence over time. Together with other theories of 
personal identity, narrative identity theory refutes assumptions about 
discontinuity and demonstrates that efforts to protect the self by 
privileging preferences at the time of the legal dispute are 
                                                                                                             
 23. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF 
REGRETTED DECISIONS 26 (1998) (noting that the possibility that a “person may 
evolve into a ‘later self’” “has had no significant impact on the courts”). 
 24. I discuss the lack of scholarly attention paid to this issue in Part I.B., 
infra. 
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misguided. I conclude that if courts wish not to enforce the 
agreements at issue, they must locate a different rationale. 
I. CHANGED PREFERENCES, CHANGED SELVES? 
We instinctively recognize that our choices, from the trifling to the 
profound, say something about ourselves. Certain choices—“relating 
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education”—are sufficiently “central to personal dignity 
and autonomy” that the Supreme Court has seen fit to protect them 
from state interference.25 Though the state cannot regulate many 
personhood-constitutive choices, people sometimes seek the state’s 
involvement by entering into agreements that they intend to be legally 
binding.26 That is because the choices at issue, although intensely 
personal, often involve the participation of other intimates and because 
the decision-makers desire some certainty about the consequences of 
their choices before they commit.27  
Courts and scholars have struggled to make sense of judicial 
involvement in this private legal space. On the one hand, it seems 
inherent in choices of a constitutional stature that courts must respect a 
person’s commitments regarding them. But when that person’s 
preferences have changed, courts must struggle with the consequences 
of holding the person to his earlier commitments, even if they were 
initially his to make. This dilemma raises questions about the 
continuity and identification between selves over time.  
In this Part, I will define the concept of personal identity and 
examine how contracts scholars and courts have engaged it. That 
backdrop will serve to demonstrate how the different selves rationale 
expresses a novel identity-skepticism within the contract context. 
A. Defining Personal Identity 
Although the phrase “personal identity” is not susceptible to a 
single definition, I use the term here to refer to that which “makes 
                                                                                                             
 25. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 26. Parties have sought to enter binding prenuptial and postnuptial 
agreements, agreements governing gamete donation and the use of in vitro 
fertilization, agreements to serve as a parent or to avoid legal parentage, and 
agreements to raise children in a certain religion or in a certain geographic area, 
to name a few. 
 27. See, e.g., Matsumura, supra note 20, passim (discussing the importance 
of contracts governing the use of assisted reproductive technologies in securing 
the expectation of the parties); Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 1232, 1255 
(noting the importance of contract law in protecting the parties expectations in 
the context of marriage). 
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one the person one is,” “unique as an individual and different from 
others.”28 Theories of personal identity address the question of 
what it means for a person to persist over time, such that it is 
possible for a person in the present to identify with past and future 
versions of herself.29 What, for example, allows a person to point 
to a photograph of a child and say, “That’s me,” or enables a 
person taking actions like quitting smoking to believe she is 
benefiting a future version of herself rather than a different person? 
Implicit in these questions is the notion that a person may change 
in certain respects from time to time and that either that person or 
others may feel the need to identify or connect the selves at both 
points in time.30 A successful theory of personal identity will 
answer these questions, grounding concepts of moral responsibility 
and self-regarding action in the process.31  
For centuries, philosophers have attempted to answer these 
questions, both in terms of identification—how to tell whether 
some present object is the same as a past object—and 
constitution—specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for personal identity.32 Broadly speaking, the existing approaches 
depend on either some sort of psychological continuity or 
biological and physical continuity. Adherents to the psychological 
approach believe that chains of psychological features—such as 
beliefs, memories, preferences, rational thoughts, and desires—
connect a being over time.33 The psychological approach accords 
with characteristics about the self that people value and commonly 
associate with their identity, like their thoughts and memories. But 
                                                                                                             
 28. Eric T. Olson, Personal Identity, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2010), available at http://plato.stan 
ford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/identity-personal/, archived at http://perma.cc 
/8BXX-KTRN. 
 29. See id.; David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics, in THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2012), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/identity-ethics/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/PWM2-JUWN. 
 30. Some psychologists have drawn a sharp distinction between the 
concepts of “self” and “identity,” with “self” referring to “both the subjective 
sense of ‘I’ and the objective sense of ‘me[,]’” and “identity” referring to the 
“way that the I begins to arrange or configure the me[,] . . . provid[ing] life with 
some semblance of psychosocial unity and purpose.” Dan P. McAdams, The 
Redemptive Self: Narrative Identity in America Today, in THE SELF AND 
MEMORY 95, 99 (Denise R. Beike, James M. Lampinen, & Douglas A. Behrend 
eds., 2004) (first emphasis added). 
 31. See Shoemaker, supra note 29. I will elaborate on these theories in Part 
IV.A., infra. 
 32. See MARYA SCHECHTMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF SELVES 7–8 (1996). 
 33. See DAVID DEGRAZIA, HUMAN IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS 13–22 (2005); 
Olson, supra note 28; Shoemaker, supra note 29. 
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it struggles to explain why we might think of a person in a 
permanent vegetative state as the same as the previously-active 
version of the person rather than a different person entirely. The 
biological approach responds to this challenge by emphasizing the 
importance of the physical body (or biological organism) in 
providing persistence over time.34 Philosophers have long argued 
about the validity of these approaches. But even philosophers who 
contend that no theory can fully explain the concept of identity 
agree that some relation must connect different selves over time.35 
It is on that common ground that this Article rests. 
The preoccupation with personal identity extends beyond the 
realm of philosophy. As literary critic Peter Brooks has pointed 
out, the question of “[w]ho you are—in the sense of what you can 
legitimately call yourself, and what others call you”—became a 
societal and legal preoccupation in the nineteenth century.36 The 
quest for self-knowledge was one aspect of this preoccupation; the 
desire to discipline and punish was another.37 Indeed, perhaps the 
most salient purpose that personal identity serves in the law is 
justifying the imposition of punishment for past acts.38 
Punishment, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Any time the 
law seeks to deter or incentivize action, or impose consequences 
for past behavior, it does so based on assumptions of personal 
identity: a sufficient relation between multiple selves.39 For if I 
was a different person yesterday than I am today and I will be 
tomorrow, I could not plan for my future or suffer the 
consequences of acts committed in the past.  
The law, then, generally assumes the existence of a continuous 
personal identity whatever the precise theory that justifies it.40 For 
the remainder of this Article, I will refer to the law’s general 
                                                                                                             
 34. See DEGRAZIA, supra note 33, at 46–51; Olson, supra note 28; 
Shoemaker, supra note 29. 
 35. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 313–20, 325 (1984) (noting 
the presence of some relation between temporally distinct selves); Shoemaker, 
supra note 29. 
 36. PETER BROOKS, ENIGMAS OF IDENTITY 4 (2011). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. 
L. REV. 395 (1990) (considering the importance of personal identity to criminal 
theories of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation). 
 39. See id. at 412, 419–20; Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Policy and Personal 
Identity Over Time, 62 TAX L. REV. 333 (2009) (noting the impact of personal 
identity on how one assesses the distributional effects of tax policy). 
 40. See Dresser, supra note 38, at 427–35 (arguing both that the law 
imposes consequences based on conceptions of personal identity and excuses 
acts in situations where personal identity might come under question (based on 
incapacity, lack of memory, etc.)). 
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embrace of a continuous view of personal identity as the “generic 
view” to distinguish it from the other, more specific, approaches to 
personal identity discussed above. 
B. Scholarly Foundations of the Different Selves Rationale 
For the most part, existing scholarly accounts of contract law have 
not devoted much attention to how personal identity affects the 
enforceability of agreements.41 When concerns regarding cognitive 
limitations or multiple selves in contracting have arisen at all, those 
concerns have tended to focus on increasing the efficiency of 
contracting practices, not relieving parties of their contractual 
obligations.42 Although the dilemma that arises when a court enforces 
                                                                                                             
 41. Scholars recognizing contract law’s importance in allowing people to 
satisfy their individual interests have largely accepted the generic view of 
personal identity without question. Both law-and-economics and philosophically 
minded scholars, for instance, presume an autonomous decision maker who may 
benefit from or be morally obligated to perform his promises. The questions of 
how contract law can facilitate the enforcement of economically efficient private 
exchanges and discourage inefficient exchanges, or how it interacts with 
concepts of moral agency, assume an autonomous decision-maker who is 
meaningfully connected across time. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT 
AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981); Richard 
Craswell, In that Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the Demands of 
Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 906 (2003) (identifying the value of efficiency 
as the concern of most mainstream law and economics scholarship); Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV. 
481, 517 (2008) (discussing how the ability to make binding promises is essential to 
the creation of meaningful personal relationships). There have been a few 
instances in which scholars in other fields have noted the impact that a changed, 
or multiple-selves view, would have on criminal punishment, see, e.g., Dresser, 
supra note 38, passim, or marriage, see, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational 
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 58–62 (1990) 
(suggesting that the concept of multiple selves might undermine the viability of 
precommitment devices in the marital context). 
 42. A rich body of scholarly work incorporates findings of cognitive 
psychologists and behavioral economists regarding the limits of parties to 
accurately predict their future preferences or to reflect their “real” preferences in 
the terms of an agreement. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of 
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1994) (identifying 
cognitive limitations and analyzing their effect on contract law); Russell Korobkin, 
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1203 (2003) (considering the implications of bounded rationality on the 
enforcement of terms in form contracts); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, 
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000) (examining how various findings 
from the behavioral sciences regarding heuristics and biases, the effect of 
bargaining context, and deviations from self-interested behavior affect the 
assumption of rational decisionmaking); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. 
Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and 
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a commitment made by a previous self in order to bind an 
unwilling later self has not escaped notice,43 the scholars tend to 
assume a sufficient level of connection to justify enforcement of 
agreements.44 Judge Richard Posner, for example, has argued from 
an instrumental perspective that the law must view the selves as 
connected in order to “promote[] social welfare overall by 
maintaining socially valuable institutions, such as contract and 
criminal punishment.”45 In short, these scholars embrace the 
generic view of personal identity. 
A few scholars, however, have argued that differences between 
the selves over time should, at least in some circumstances, relieve 
the later self from the earlier self’s commitments. Anthony 
Kronman has provided one of the leading accounts of this 
argument in his classic article, Paternalism and the Law of 
Contracts.46 Because his contentions underlie and explain the 
different selves rationale, I will deal with Kronman’s arguments at 
some length here. 
Kronman notes that every contracting situation gives rise to the 
possibility that one may make mistaken assumptions about the 
state of affairs, such that he will miss an expected benefit. 
Although this miscalculation might cause disappointment, the 
                                                                                                             
 
Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1037–41, 1054 (2012) 
(providing a more recent summary of the development of the behavioral 
economics literature in the legal academy). In a sense, this literature expresses 
some degree of skepticism about the connection of the selves over time given 
the problem that individuals might have at Time1 predicting how they will feel 
about a commitment at Time2. This body of work, however, generally focuses 
on the problems from an ex ante perspective—should we be skeptical about 
certain types of commitments at the outset?—rather than an ex post 
perspective—should we relieve a party of a commitment that he already made? 
The different selves rationale differs from this body of work in that it adopts the 
ex post rather than ex ante perspective.  
 43. Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves? Implications 
for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 23 (1997); John A. Robertson, 
Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 
989, 997 (2001) (noting that the later self could argue he was not present for the 
earlier negotiation). 
 44. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 43, at 24, 34. 
 45. Id. at 34. 
 46. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE 
L.J. 763 (1983). To date, this article has been cited in over 250 law review 
articles, some of which, in turn, have been cited by courts advancing the 
different selves rationale. See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715, 719 (N.J. 
2001) (citing Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous 
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. 
L. REV. 55, 88 (1999)). 
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promisor will often understand his contract as a rational venture 
given what he knew at the time he made the contract.47  
However, Kronman argues that “[i]f [the promisor’s] goals 
change, the contract may lose its original attractiveness and 
become pointless (or even reprehensible) from [his] point of view, 
despite the fact that all his assumptions about the world have 
proven accurate.”48 A goal change—Kronman provides religious 
conversion as an example—results in regret rather than 
disappointment.49 As a result of the change, the original framework 
within which he assessed the rationality of his previous decisions 
no longer persists, undermining his confidence in the rationality of 
his choices.50 Although it is sometimes possible to think outside 
the framework of one’s current goals, a “more radical” shift 
weakens a person’s ability to “review sympathetically” his past 
decisions.51 This disconnect renders the previous decisions 
irrational and senseless, resulting in a feeling of demoralization.  
But demoralization does not necessarily counsel against all 
forms of contract enforcement. Kronman notes that this 
justification, based on the concept of personal integrity, comes into 
play most strongly in the context of specific performance of 
personal services contracts. Such contracts, if enforced, would 
compel performance against the promisor’s will, leaving him no 
choice but to act against his wishes in the manner promised, 
thereby resulting in a form of self-enslavement.52 Although 
damages might still engender some regret, performance intensifies 
those feelings by reminding the promisor of the continuing 
influence of his former goals in his life.53 
Kronman’s theory is based on several assumptions touching on 
personal identity. First, he believes it possible for a promisor’s 
goals to change so substantially that the change renders previous 
decisions irrational to the promisor. Second, the change in goals 
can be so significant that it also leaves the promisor unable to 
empathize with (or “understand the meaningfulness” of) his 
previous choices.54 Third, this change in goals will render his 
previous choice “demoralizing” in such a way that he may lose 
“confidence in his ability to make lasting commitments and guard 
                                                                                                             
 47. Kronman, supra note 46, at 780. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Id. at 780–81. 
 51. Id. at 781. 
 52. Id. at 778–79. 
 53. See id. at 783. 
 54. Id. at 781. 
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the things he cares for.”55 And finally, the previous decision will 
remain a “foreign element” in the promisor’s life.56 
The inability of a person to integrate certain past choices into 
her current framework creates a problem of self-identification. 
Taken to their logical extreme, Kronman’s assumptions could 
suggest that personal identity is discontinuous enough to prevent 
holding a person responsible for earlier commitments. But he does 
not appear to go that far: by limiting his theory to specific 
performance of personal services contracts and allowing for the 
imposition of damages, he appears to suggest that some degree of 
responsibility—and therefore continuity—persists despite a 
person’s change in goals.57 In sum, although Kronman’s arguments 
challenge the generic view of personal identity, his refinements to 
the theory remain unclear. 
Following in the wake of Kronman’s article, several scholars 
have also challenged the generic view of personal identity. Their 
arguments primarily arise in the context of agreements for the use 
of assisted reproductive technologies because of the sensitive and 
far-reaching nature of personal commitments in that area.  
Carl Coleman, for example, has argued that agreements for the 
disposition of cryopreserved embryos created in the in vitro 
fertilization process should not be enforced because those 
agreements—which typically give frozen, fertilized embryos to 
one of the two individuals who contributed genetic material, or 
designate that the embryos shall be donated or destroyed—do not 
protect an individual’s right “to make decisions consistent with 
[his or her] contemporaneous wishes, values, and beliefs.”58 
Coleman suggests that decisions made before undergoing the IVF 
process may seem like those of a “completely different person” at 
the time a dispute arises due to intervening life changes.59 Like 
Kronman, Coleman recognizes that the law generally disregards 
mere changes of heart as an excuse to perform a contractual 
obligation.60 But Coleman does not point to a shift in goals as the 
                                                                                                             
 55. Id. at 782. 
 56. Id. 
 57. It is possible to interpret Kronman’s argument as not even applying to 
all personal services contracts but only those in which a promisor’s goals have 
changed. A person might not want to work for a particular employer because a 
better offer has materialized, but might retain the same goal of making money. It 
is unclear whether Kronman views his theory as applying to such a situation. 
 58. Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: 
An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
55, 88 (1999). 
 59. Id. at 91. 
 60. Id. at 92. 
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justification for his deviation from the norm of enforcement. 
Instead, he points to the fact that the law has traditionally treated 
certain types of choices (related to reproduction or familial 
relationships) as inalienable.61 The shortcoming of this approach is 
that the judicial decisions on which he relies say nothing about 
when internal changes should relieve a party of her own previous 
commitments. Critics of surrogacy agreements based on the idea of 
changed selves often commit a similar oversight: relying on 
intuitions about the nature of reproductive decisions to advocate 
for non-enforcement but not considering what those intuitions 
imply about personal identity.62 
In sum, contracts scholars have largely avoided developing a 
full account of how personal identity relates to the enforceability of 
agreements, implicitly endorsing the generic view. But a few 
scholars have laid the groundwork for judicial decisions that, at 
least in some circumstances, refuse to enforce agreements based on 
differences between the selves.  
C. The Rise of the Different Selves Rationale in the Courts 
Through the years, courts have sometimes refused to enforce 
agreements, especially those involving the use of assisted 
reproductive technologies, on public-policy grounds.63 The 
justifications proffered by the courts have changed over time to 
reflect different judicial conceptions of harm to the public that 
                                                                                                             
 61. See id. at 92–95. As I will argue below, Coleman’s argument is 
internally inconsistent. The decision to treat certain choices as inalienable 
because they are central to personhood implies the existence of a continuous 
personal identity. Otherwise, the infringement of those choices would not cause 
harm to a person that would be long-lasting or engender regret. But if a 
continuous personal identity exists, then he must provide a theory for when and 
how a change in the self would justify relieving a person of his contractual 
obligations. 
 62. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The “Sophie’s Choice” Paradox and 
the Discontinuous Self: Two Comments on Wertheimer, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 
1255, 1256 (1997) (“The process of carrying and giving birth to a child so 
fundamentally changes a woman—physically, emotionally, and socially—that 
her very identity may change. . . . Because of this discontinuity of identity, the 
prepregnant woman cannot bind the mother.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and 
the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J. 1811, 1818–19 (1988) (pointing to the 
“changes in feeling that we know frequently occur, and that we generally want 
to occur, during pregnancy and at birth”); Stephen G. York, A Contractual 
Analysis of Surrogate Motherhood and a Proposed Solution, 24 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 395, 419 (1991) (claiming that surrogate mothers are “unable to critically 
evaluate what their own desires and interests will be after the child is born”). 
 63. See Matsumura, supra note 20, at 178–90. 
2014] BINDING FUTURE SELVES 87 
 
 
 
would result from enforcement.64 The refusal to enforce an 
agreement based on perceived differences between selves of the 
same party over time, however, breaks new ground as the 
following discussion will demonstrate. 
Recall that in the A.Z. v. B.Z. case, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court refused to enforce an agreement between the 
spouses that gave control of cryopreserved embryos to the wife in 
the event of the couple’s separation because to do so would compel 
a person to become a parent “against his or her will.”65 That 
rationale has been extended in several other cases. 
In J.B. v. M.B.,66 former spouses asked the New Jersey 
Supreme Court to resolve a dispute over the possession and use of 
cryopreserved embryos that the parties created during the IVF 
process. In the case, a couple with fertility problems entered into a 
written agreement with a fertility clinic in March 1995, stating that 
“all control, direction, and ownership of our tissues will be 
relinquished to [the clinic]” following “dissolution of our marriage 
by court order, unless the court specifies who takes control and 
direction of the tissues.”67 In May 1995, the IVF procedure was 
carried out, resulting in the creation of eleven embryos, seven of 
which were cryopreserved.68 The wife, J.B., became pregnant and 
gave birth to the couple’s daughter in March 1996. Within six 
months, though, the couple’s marriage unraveled, and J.B. told her 
husband that she wanted the remaining embryos discarded. The 
parties’ legal dispute centered on what would happen to the 
remaining embryos: M.B. sought an order compelling J.B. to either 
implant the embryos or allow their donation to infertile couples.69 
He averred that the couple had come to an oral agreement before 
undergoing the IVF process that any unused embryos would be 
used or donated, a position consistent with his religious beliefs.70 
J.B., on the other hand, claimed that the decision to use IVF was 
“made during a time when defendant and I were married and 
                                                                                                             
 64. In In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), for example, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court listed a number of harms that could result from the 
enforcement of a surrogacy contract: “the impact on the child who learns her life 
was bought, that she is the offspring of someone who gave birth to her only to 
obtain money; the impact on the natural mother as the full weight of her 
isolation is felt along with the full reality of the sale of her body and her child; 
the impact on the natural father and adoptive mother once they realize the 
consequences of their conduct.” Id. at 1250. 
 65. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000). 
 66. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
 67. Id. at 710. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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intended to remain married” and “planned to raise a family 
together as a married couple.”71 She asserted that she and her 
husband never discussed what to do with remaining embryos if the 
marriage dissolved.72 
The J.B. court first considered whether the parties entered into 
a binding agreement for the disposition of the cryopreserved 
embryos. The case essentially presented the court with several 
options: it could either look to the written consent form executed 
by both spouses with the clinic; conclude that the parties entered 
into an oral agreement as urged by M.B.; or conclude, contrary to 
the existence of the written form, that the parties never discussed 
what to do with the embryos if they divorced, as J.B. had claimed. 
The consent form required both spouses to express their 
preferences about what steps the clinic should take if the parties 
were to divorce, but that clause “carve[d] out an exception that 
permit[ted] the parties to obtain a court order directing disposition 
of the preembryos.”73 The court concluded that this language was 
too conditional and ambiguous to control.74 Moreover, the court 
rejected M.B.’s assertion that the parties reached an oral 
agreement, holding that any agreement for the disposition of 
embryos would have to be “formal, unambiguous [as to] the 
parties’ intentions,” and in writing.75 
The court went on to hold that even if the parties had entered 
into an unambiguous written agreement, their contractual freedom 
would be limited in several respects. It recognized that the decision 
at stake implicated interests of a constitutional magnitude and was 
therefore “theirs to make.”76 But it implicitly rejected the notion 
that the parties’ prior choices mattered if they later reconsidered:77 
notwithstanding the fact that the clinic’s consent form asked 
parties to specify their preferences if they divorced, the court 
reasoned that “at the point when a husband and wife decide to 
begin the in vitro fertilization process, they are unlikely to 
anticipate divorce or to be concerned about the disposition of 
preembryos on divorce.”78 
Responding to the differences between the pre-divorce and 
post-divorce selves, the court held that enforcement of an embryo 
disposition agreement preventing a party from reconsidering a 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 713. 
 74. Id. at 713–14. 
 75. Id. at 714. 
 76. Id. at 715. 
 77. Id. (focusing on the problem of later disagreement). 
 78. Id. 
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previous commitment would violate public policy.79 The court 
expressed concern that “forc[ing]” a person “to become a 
biological parent against his or her will”80 “could have life-long 
emotional and psychological repercussions,”81 echoing Anthony 
Kronman’s concerns about demoralization.82 The court therefore 
held that it would enforce cryopreservation agreements “subject to 
the right of either party to change his or her mind about disposition 
up to the point of use or destruction of any stored preembryos.”83  
This decision departs from a traditional contract approach: 
enforcing an agreement only as long as the parties voluntarily 
perform their obligations essentially amounts to a rejection of the 
understanding of a contract as a binding agreement.84 This is 
especially the case where the parties are allowed not to perform 
based on their internal change of mind.85 
The justifications for this departure implicate two key aspects 
of the generic view of personal identity. First, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court expressed suspicion about the ability of parties to 
predict their preferences in the realm of childrearing and to 
anticipate the effect of contingencies like divorce, even if 
prompted by terms in the agreement. In other words, it doubted the 
ability of parties to be self-regarding, at least in the area of 
procreational decision-making.86 Second, the court questioned the 
extent to which a person could be held accountable for his or her 
prior decisions. By pitting a person’s “earlier acquiescence” 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. at 718. I criticize the court’s reliance on public policy at length in a 
previous work. See Matsumura, supra note 20, passim. 
 80. J.B., 783 A.2d at 718 (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. at 717. The court’s concern about emotional and psychological 
repercussions suggests its belief that a party’s change of position in these 
circumstances will be genuine, substantial, and not based on strategic 
opportunism or the bare desire to harm the other. 
 82. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text; see also Kronman, supra 
note 46, at 782–83. 
 83. J.B., 783 A.2d at 719. 
 84. See, e.g., Recent Cases, Family Law—Contract—Supreme Court of New 
Jersey Holds That Preembryo Disposition Agreements Are Not Binding When 
One Party Later Objects, 115 HARV. L. REV. 701, 704 (2001) (“Because mere 
disagreement by either party vitiates the contract in favor of balancing the 
procreative rights of the parties, there is really no contract.”). On the other hand, 
the court could have gone further and made the agreement itself illegal. See, e.g., 
Todd D. Rakoff, Is “Freedom from Contract” Necessarily a Libertarian 
Freedom?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 477, 477 (2004) (noting that on the extreme end 
of the spectrum of contract enforcement are agreements that cannot even be 
made without violating the law). 
 85. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 26 (noting that courts have 
generally been unsympathetic to internal changes of mind). 
 86. J.B., 783 A.2d at 715. 
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against his “subsequent[] reconsider[ation],” the court drew a line 
between the selves, setting up a situation in which it would have to 
choose which self to privilege.87 And by refusing to force a party 
“to become a biological parent against his or her will,” it sided 
with the current self. 
We see these concerns reflected in several other judicial 
opinions resolving embryo disposition disputes. In In re Marriage 
of Witten,88 the Iowa Supreme Court also refused to enforce a 
clinic consent form in which the parties indicated their preference 
for the disposition of embryos. The spouses, Tamera and Trip, had 
specified that the clinic could only release or dispose of embryos 
with the signed approval of both spouses.89 Unlike the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, the Iowa Supreme Court treated the consent form 
as an otherwise valid agreement between the parties.90 But it 
similarly rejected a contractual approach to the dispute, citing 
Professor Coleman’s argument that “‘individuals are entitled to 
make decisions consistent with their contemporaneous wishes, 
values, and beliefs.’”91 Based on this view, the court held that 
embryo disposition agreements would only be enforceable between 
the progenitors as long as they did not change their minds and that 
embryos would remain cryopreserved unless and until such a 
change of mind occurred.92  
Self-continuity-based concerns affect the enforceability of 
other types of agreements as well. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court invalidated an agreement by a woman to co-parent 
her former partner’s child based on its “reluctance to . . . bind 
individuals to future family relationships.”93 Implicit in the fear of 
“binding” a person is the assumption that the person does not wish 
to be bound; but that person is only unwillingly bound in the future 
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. at 718. 
 88. 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
 89. Id. at 772. 
 90. Id. at 773. 
 91. Id. at 777 (quoting Coleman, supra note 58, at 88–89). 
 92. Id. at 783. Interestingly, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the 
agreements would be fully enforceable by the fertility clinics, notwithstanding 
the parties’ inability to enforce the agreements against each other. See id. at 782. 
Virtually all clinics only agree to store embryos for a certain length of time. The 
Iowa Supreme Court therefore created a default rule favoring destruction of the 
embryos in most circumstances. 
 93. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1250 (Mass. 2004). The nonmarital 
status of the partners no doubt mattered a great deal here. The state of 
Massachusetts apparently has no problem authorizing the voluntary adoption by 
a stepparent, nor would it appear to hesitate to impose parental obligations upon 
that stepparent. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 1 (2014) (setting forth the 
grounds and procedures of adoption). 
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if his or her earlier consent is not legally significant. Likewise, a 
Pennsylvania court refused to enforce a prenuptial agreement 
specifying that all of the couple’s children would be raised in the 
Jewish faith.94 The court noted that it would be difficult for an 
interreligious couple to “project themselves into the future” in 
order to predict how they would feel about the raising of their 
children and that the subject matter of the agreement would 
infringe “[t]he constitutional freedom to question, to doubt, and to 
change one’s convictions.”95  
To be sure, there are other concerns at work in these decisions, 
and the courts’ discomfort with available remedies is prime among 
them.96 But these decisions all explicitly rest on differences 
between the selves over time that the courts have treated as legally 
relevant. In so doing, these decisions reveal that concerns about 
self-continuity have gained purchase with the courts, even though 
the courts’ conceptions of personal identity are often hazy at best.  
In the next Part, I will argue that courts do in fact see the 
different selves rationale as a viable solution to the problems posed 
by intimate agreements. I will simultaneously investigate whether 
the different selves rationale presents a plausible alternative theory 
of personal identity in the contract context.  
                                                                                                             
 94. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). See 
also, e.g., Weiss v. Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Ct. App. 1996) (involving a 
similar holding on a similar type of agreement). 
 95. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1146–47. The Zummo court arguably offers a 
slightly different argument against enforcement based not on a disjuncture 
between selves, but on the fact that religious beliefs are expected to change in a 
“lifelong dynamic process.” Id. at 1146. Such a rationale could depend more on 
the religious matter than views of the self. Nevertheless, the court’s decision 
shares the notion that the generic view of personal identity does not suffice to 
hold a person to his earlier commitments.  
 96. See, e.g., T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1251 (expressing concerns about “‘direct 
enforcement’” of personal choices related to becoming a parent (internal citation 
omitted)); Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781 (noting the court’s historical “reluctance 
to become involved in intimate questions inherent in personal relationships” 
because of problems with “enforcement”); In re Baby Boy C., 638 N.E.2d 963, 
967 (N.Y. 1994) (declining to enforce a consent to adoption on the ground that it 
would be difficult to order “faithful performance of such contracts”). In the 
Zummo case, the court was troubled both by the vagueness of the childrearing 
agreement and of concerns that interpretation of the agreement would lead to 
entanglement with religious decision-making in violation of the First 
Amendment. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1144–46. 
92 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
II. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE DIFFERENT SELVES 
RATIONALE 
In this Part, I explore the assumptions on which the different 
selves rationale rests in order to demonstrate more fully what is at 
stake in the decision to reject the generic view of personal 
identity.97 By demonstrating the extent of the departure, this Part 
will ultimately enable a better understanding of the role we expect 
personal identity to play in contract law. 
The different selves rationale of personal identity has 
significant implications for contract law. Treating a contractual 
commitment not as the expression of a person’s will but rather as 
the binding of a later self, the legitimacy of which may be 
questioned, opens up all agreements to scrutiny.98 Courts 
advancing the different selves rationale appear to assume that the 
rationale would only apply to certain intimate agreements. But the 
implications of their position sweep broadly, especially in the 
following three respects: (1) they question a person’s ability to 
make future commitments; (2) they vastly extend freedom of 
choice beyond the protection of the circumstances in which 
choices are made to reconsideration of the choices themselves; and 
(3) they privilege preferences at the time of the legal dispute over 
preferences either prior to or after the dispute is resolved. 
A. Future Commitments and Alienability 
Proponents of the different selves rationale have largely limited 
this rationale against contract enforcement to a class of 
“emotional”99 or “delicate and intimate”100 decisions related to 
matters of the family101 or freedom of conscience.102 This category 
                                                                                                             
 97. I acknowledge that the generic view of personal identity also reflects 
certain assumptions or value judgments. Just because that view is “generic” does 
not mean it is not ideological. Rather, the assumptions raised by the different 
selves rationale should cause us to question how firmly we should adhere to the 
generic view, and whether aspects of that view require revision. 
 98. A different selves rationale therefore creates a line-drawing challenge: 
Is a changed preference always the preference of a different self? And does the 
fact of a different self always excuse performance under an agreement or only in 
conjunction with certain types of choices? 
 99. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781; J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717 (N.J. 2001). 
 100. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 101. See, e.g., Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781 (“marital and family relationships”); 
J.B., 783 A.2d at 719 (“family relationships”); A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059 (“familial 
relationships (marriage or parenthood)”). 
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of choices closely tracks those that the Supreme Court has found to 
reside in the liberty and privacy protections of the Due Process 
Clause.103 The assumption that choices pertaining to the family or 
intimate conduct—such as whether to get married or divorced, to 
engage in sexual conduct, or to have or give up children—are 
entitled to different treatment from other types of choices is not 
novel. Some have responded by taking the position that these 
intimate choices should be the subject of a rule prohibiting their 
transfer on the market;104 others have suggested prophylactic or 
protective rules to prevent improvident decisions.105 The different 
selves rationale differs in its reasoning and prescriptive solutions 
from these other legal issues but shares their line-drawing 
challenges.106 That is to say, it struggles to explain why people 
would be free to make certain choices in advance—like spousal 
support provisions in prenuptial agreements—but not others—like 
the use of cryopreserved embryos.107 
                                                                                                             
 
 102. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) 
(involving the freedom to choose the religious upbringing of one’s children). 
 103. See Coleman, supra note 58, at 95–96 (arguing that reproductive 
decisions are inalienable and noting that “most decisions about these matters are 
constitutionally protected”); see also J.B., 783 A.2d at 716–17 (noting the 
constitutional dimension of the choices at issue). 
 104. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 1849, 1906 (1987) (proposing a market-inalienability rule for choices 
“integral to the self,” such as choices pertaining to “politics, work, religion, 
family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, experiences, wisdom, moral 
commitments, character, and personal attributes”); Jennifer E. Rothman, The 
Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 209–10 (2012) [hereinafter 
Rothman, The Inalienable Right] (arguing that certain constitutional rights are 
inalienable and that the right of publicity should fall within those protections). 
 105. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158–59 (2007) (prohibiting 
certain abortion methods to protect women from the regret they could 
experience upon finding out how their fetuses were terminated). 
 106. Critics of Professor Radin’s anti-commodification view note the 
difficulties her theory faces in determining exactly which commodities should 
be market-inalienable. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 26–27 (1993) (noting that Radin’s own proposed 
approach requires a “case-by-case” determination of when the subject of a 
transaction would be too central to personhood to be commodified and that it 
ultimately raises empirical questions that her theory cannot answer). Professor 
Rothman has likewise acknowledged that relying on the Supreme Court’s 
category of “fundamental rights” to determine what an individual can properly 
alienate is somewhat indeterminate. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating 
Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 503–07 
(2010). 
 107. The act of drawing lines between the intimate and non-intimate realms 
is fraught with challenges. For example, Benjamin Means has called attention to 
the prevalence of family-owned businesses and the complicated interplay 
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But the difficulty of cabining the different selves rationale 
extends beyond the indeterminacy of the category of marriage and 
the family. A further problem with this limitation is that it fails to 
explain why choices that people make all the time notwithstanding 
their emotional nature cannot be the subject of advance agreement. 
People make unilateral choices not to procreate by choosing 
abstinence, birth control, or abortion.108 Some such choices, like 
sterilization, are common and irreversible and are performed 
notwithstanding the possibility of later regret.109 People also make 
decisions regarding sex and reproduction involving others by 
consenting to sexual contact—in essence waiving or transferring 
the right to be free from unwanted contact or bodily invasion110—
or engaging in sexual behavior with the understanding that it could 
result in the birth of a child.111 The law generally treats these 
decisions as valid absent exceptional circumstances like coercion 
or duress.112 The nature of these choices, then, does not render 
them fully inalienable.113 The rights at stake—e.g., to engage in 
                                                                                                             
 
between the economic and domestic functions of those businesses, as well as the 
uncertain overlay between family law and corporate law when dealing with 
governance disputes. See Benjamin Means, The Contractual Foundation of 
Family-Business Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1, 
15–20, passim) (on file with author).  
 108. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 43, at 1026 (“We can relinquish the 
right [to reproduce] totally by sterilization. We may waive it in a particular 
instance by abstinence, contraception, or abortion.”).  
 109. See, e.g., R.E. Lawrence et al., Factors Influencing Physicians’ Advice 
About Female Sterilization in USA: A National Survey, 26 HUM. REPROD. 106, 
106, 109 (2011) (noting that millions of women have used female sterilization in 
the U.S., and that physicians often perform the procedure despite their 
recognition that the patient might experience regret); Susan D. Hillis et al., 
Poststerilization Regret: Findings From the United States Collaborative Review 
of Sterilization, 93 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 889, 890 (1999) (noting the 
prevalence of sterilization and regret). 
 110. See Shiffrin, supra note 41, at 500, 502 (conceiving of consent to 
intimate conduct as the transfer of an obligation that an agent “otherwise could 
make about entry into her personal space”). 
 111. Cf. Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 428–31 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the 
imposition of parental obligations on a man based on his voluntary sexual 
conduct). 
 112. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of 
Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1379 (2013) (explaining how the value 
of sexual autonomy intersects with evolving prohibitions on rape). 
 113. As Professor Radin and others have noted, “[m]eanings [of 
‘inalienability’] proliferate because the separation that constitutes alienation can 
be either voluntary or involuntary, and can result in the entitlement, right, or 
attribute ending up in the hands of another holder, or in its simply being lost or 
extinguished.” Radin, supra note 104, at 1852. As a result, when people use the 
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sexual contact, to have a child through one’s genetic material, or to 
terminate one’s parental rights—can be given or transferred and in 
some cases even sold.114 Moreover, many of these decisions have 
significant consequences: the decision to have a child creates a 
long period of legal obligation, accompanied by the additional 
burden of caring about that child’s well-being or having that 
child’s existence attributed to you by others;115 sterilization, once 
done, cannot be undone, at least absent significant expense; the 
decision to surrender a child for adoption may create lasting 
regret.116 
The real issue is why these decisions, which we acknowledge 
can freely be made now, cannot be the subject of advance 
agreement. The underlying choice itself largely remains constant, 
as do its consequences. The primary reason for discomfort with 
these agreements, therefore, is their futurity.  
Courts generally do not experience this discomfort when 
dealing with the transfer of property of sentimental value, such as 
the family home. Nor do they prevent the advance waiver of other 
constitutional rights. Although virtually all constitutional criminal 
protections can be waived contemporaneously,117 some can also be 
waived by advance agreement. Probationers, for example, can 
waive their Fourth Amendment right against suspicionless searches 
in their probation agreements.118 Agreements that waive a party’s due 
process or Seventh Amendment rights (through settlement, private 
arbitration, or forum-selection clauses) are routinely enforced, as are 
agreements restricting free speech, such as confidentiality 
                                                                                                             
 
term “inalienable,” they could mean that an entitlement, right, or attribute is 
“nonforfeitable,” “noncancelable,” “nonwaivable,” “nongiveable,” “nonsalable,” 
or “completely nontransferable.” Id. at 1853.  
 114. Sperm and egg “donors” are typically compensated by fertility clinics 
for their gametes. See Nancy E. Dowd, Sperm, Testosterone, Masculinities and 
Fatherhood, 13 NEV. L.J. 438, 442 (2013). 
 115. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1115, 1135–37 (2008) (describing the psychological harms that might 
result from public recognition that he or she is a genetic parent even in absence 
of legal or gestational obligations). 
 116. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 255, 280 (2011) (noting that regret over surrenders rarely affects the 
validity of consent to adoption); Coleman, supra note 58, at 82 n.42. 
 117. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to 
Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1186 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, The 
Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate]. 
 118. United States v. King, 711 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding a 
search pursuant to a “warrantless search condition, . . . with or without probable 
cause”). 
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agreements.119 Although many scholars have expressed discomfort 
with these waivers,120 the long-term trend has favored them.121 
The approval of agreements providing for the advance waiver 
of other constitutional rights does not necessarily mandate similar 
treatment for choices of the type protected by substantive due 
process. But it does mean that one cannot simply rely on the fact 
that the choices are constitutionally protected in order to 
categorically exempt them from the realm of contract. To treat 
them differently requires some sort of justification. One possibility 
is that people are more likely to change their minds regarding these 
intimate choices than other types of choices in their lives. Another 
is that separate policy reasons exist to restrict choices of this nature 
because of some perceived harm to the person or to society.122 
None of the proponents of the different selves rationale make these 
arguments or offer support for them. These justifications do not 
even sound especially plausible from an armchair perspective: are 
people really more likely to change their views about having 
children than they are about what type of career to pursue with 
their law degree or whether to own or rent a home?123 
                                                                                                             
 119. See Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, supra 
note 117, at 1186–91 (providing examples); Rothman, The Inalienable Right, 
supra note 104, at 217 (noting that “one can waive one’s speech rights by 
agreeing to be employed by the government, which brings with it certain 
restrictions on what one can say”). Rothman also argues that even if the 
common law right of publicity were constitutionally protected, it should still be 
the proper subject of a limited contractual waiver. See Rothman, The Inalienable 
Right, supra note 104, at 209, 234.  
 120. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and 
Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 269–74 (1998) (providing 
examples of contracts restricting speech but ultimately arguing that not all 
advance waivers of speech rights should be allowed).  
 121. The mechanics of waiver by contract is a subject that deserves more 
attention than I am able to give it in this Article. By citing examples of other 
types of constitutional waivers, I do not mean to endorse the validity of those 
waivers in all instances. I only intend to prove that something more than the 
constitutional status of a right must justify its inalienability. 
 122. This last reason is less plausible given that courts have said that the 
government has no business interfering in these types of decisions. 
 123. A meta-analysis of regret-ranking studies found that people were more 
likely to regret decisions about education or careers than decisions about romance or 
family. Neal J. Roese & Amy Summerville, What We Regret Most . . . and Why, 31 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1273, 1281 (2005). One colorful example 
involves Angus T. Jones, a star on the popular sitcom “Two and a Half Men,” who 
recorded a video in which he asked viewers to “‘please stop watching’” his 
show and said he no longer wished to appear on it. Bill Carter, Another Star 
Lashes Out, and “Two and a Half Men” Keeps Cruising, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 
2012, 3:43 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/another-
star-lashes-out-and-two-and-a-half-men-keeps-cruising/, archived at http://per 
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In other words, the justifications for the different selves 
rationale are that the self has changed and that the self has changed 
with respect to intimate choices differently than it has changed 
with respect to other choices that the courts and commentators 
would not see fit to protect. Unless these underlying assumptions 
hold, there is either no reason to depart from the generic view of 
personal identity or no reason not to consider the different selves 
rationale in other areas of contracting. 
B. Beyond Negative Liberty: The Unbounded Self? 
Conceptions of autonomy can range from thin to thick based on 
how broadly the right of personal autonomy is characterized and 
how far the law is willing to go to protect it.124 The different selves 
rationale presumes an incredibly thick right, yet undermines it in 
significant respects.  
The Supreme Court has said of the types of choices captured in 
intimate agreements that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self 
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain 
intimate conduct.”125 This understanding of autonomy sounds 
capacious. But even the Court’s arguably more far-reaching 
decisions, like the recent decision in United States v. Windsor,126 
have largely sought only to protect conditions in which such 
choices are made by striking down governmental restrictions.127 
These decisions are not helpful when it comes to resolving 
disputes over private agreements, however, because they do not 
                                                                                                             
 
ma.cc/U9D4-W2HR. People speculated that Jones’s change of mind was 
influenced by his religious beliefs. See id. Within a week, Jones publicly 
apologized for his remarks. Id. 
 124. See Rubenfeld, supra note 112, at 1417 (contending that in the area of 
sex, courts’ conceptions of autonomy are “very thick”). 
 125. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 126. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (striking down section three of the 
Defense of Marriage Act because it “demeans the couple, whose moral and 
sexual choices the Constitution protects . . . and whose relationship the State has 
sought to dignify”). 
 127. See id.; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.”). The notion that the 
Constitution only guarantees a form of negative liberty has been challenged by 
scholars, see, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990), and is, at any rate, supplemented by laws creating 
positive obligations on behalf of the state, see, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1120 (2002) (noting that the 
state has an affirmative duty to protect its citizens’ rights of privacy through 
“property rights, tort law, criminal law, and other legal devices”). 
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answer the question of whether a person’s previous choices 
constitute an improper restriction of his current freedom. In other 
words, having removed improper restraints on a person’s initial 
choice, has the state satisfied its constitutional obligations? 128 Or 
must the state protect the person from his prior choice in order to 
ensure his privacy or liberty? The different selves rationale 
answers the latter question affirmatively: to enforce the agreement 
would amount to the state “forcing” the person to do what he no 
longer wishes rather than the person himself doing the forcing.129  
By conferring a right to reconsider one’s initial choice, the 
different selves rationale conveys a much broader freedom of 
action than the generic view of personal identity. That is because 
the person’s freedom of action is not constrained by the state or by 
that person’s prior commitments. The person is given the right to 
always live in accordance with his “basic sense of self” at the 
present moment, the self unbounded.130  
However, by enhancing a person’s individual freedom, the 
different selves rationale diminishes that person’s ability to pursue 
goals that require the cooperation of others. Many choices of an 
intimate nature are collaborative rather than atomistic: sex, 
reproduction, and marriage all involve the participation of others. 
As numerous contracts scholars have noted, one’s ability to obtain 
something of value often depends on securing the cooperation of 
another; where neither party has a guarantee that the other will 
                                                                                                             
 128. Implicit in these questions is a larger, and unresolved, dispute about 
whether enforcement of private agreements can violate the Constitution, and in 
what circumstances. The most comprehensive discussion of this issue within the 
context of agreements for the use of reproductive technologies can be found in 
Cohen, supra note 115, at 1172–83 (concluding that the enforcement of private 
agreements likely does not trigger state action). Other scholars have assumed 
that enforcement would constitute state action without lengthy analysis of the 
issue. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 43, at 1027 n.167; Marjorie Maguire 
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity 
for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 362 (1990) [hereinafter Shultz, 
Reproductive Technology]. Although I sidestep the state action question now, I 
intend to address it in future work. 
 129. On the issue of “forcing,” see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 
(Mass. 2000); Coleman, supra note 58, at 96. 
 130. Coleman, supra note 58, at 96. Coleman suggests that “[m]aking the 
right to control these decisions inalienable ensures that, as a person’s identity 
changes over time, she will not be forced to live with the consequences of prior 
decisions” like “mourning, guilt, and regret.” Id. at 96–97. As I discussed above, 
however, even contemporaneous choices on reproductive matters can have 
unavoidably significant consequences. And as I will discuss in the next Part, the 
choices one makes at the time of the legal dispute can bring future regret. 
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perform, there may be a failure to deal.131 Even where there is not, 
when parties do enter into agreements, granting each of them the 
freedom to reconsider his or her earlier commitments leaves both in a 
position to infringe the freedom of the other. In In re Marriage of 
Witten, for example, the practical consequence of granting Trip Witten 
the freedom to object at any time to the use of cryopreserved embryos 
created with his sperm was that Tamera, his ex-wife, could never use 
those embryos barring his later change of mind.132 Although one 
might argue that Tamera could reproduce through other means, she 
was a thirty-six-year-old with a history of fertility problems, so her 
ability to have a biological child was certainly made more difficult 
without the cryopreserved embryos.133 In J.B., it was the wife’s 
preference not to use the embryos that interfered with the husband’s 
desire, consonant with his religious beliefs, to create life.134 
By granting a right to reconsider one’s initial choices, the 
different selves rationale also illustrates the influence of existing 
default rules that operate to resolve stalemates. Although either 
party to an embryo disposition agreement could subsequently 
prefer to use the embryos rather than to destroy them, a rule 
regarding contemporaneous mutual consent for use would always 
privilege non-use. 
Thus, even when courts provide individuals maximum freedom 
to reconsider their earlier decisions, their choices may be limited 
by others’ choices or default preferences. 
C. Choosing Between Selves  
The previous two subparts demonstrate that the different selves 
rationale raises questions that could significantly impact the way we 
think about contractual commitments. The rationale raises an 
additional conceptual question: acknowledging that preferences 
                                                                                                             
 131. Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 1255–56 (suggesting that relationships 
that do not impose legal consequences for defection discourage investment in 
those relationships). 
 132. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003). 
 133. Brief of Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 8, In re Marriage of 
Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (No. 03-0551); Reply Brief of 
Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 8, In re Marriage of Witten, 672 
N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (No. 03-0551). 
 134. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 712, 720 (N.J. 2001). Several scholars have 
found this harm to the other contracting party’s reliance interests sufficient to 
justify a rule protecting them. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 43, at 1001–04, 
1029. I agree that reliance is a powerful concern in this context, but do not 
depend on this independent line of thinking in my analysis of the identity 
problem.  
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change, why privilege a person’s preferences at the time of a legal 
dispute? 
On first glance, a later preference might seem more valid than 
an earlier preference, as it can take into account both the earlier 
preference and subsequent changes. Implicit in this view is the 
assumption that additional information makes the subsequent 
preference superior to the previous, less-informed preference.135 
Note, as an initial matter, that honoring the later preference on this 
basis would depart substantially from the traditional view in 
contract law that a commitment is binding even without complete 
information on all possible contingencies: “you must often decide 
on the basis of such information as you already have or can 
conveniently acquire, and you are expected, by and large, to bear 
the consequences of not having enough.”136 But even accepting 
this reasoning, a person’s preferences at the time of the legal 
dispute should not necessarily control. That is because the 
possibility of change, and the inevitability that new information 
will be acquired as one lives her life, invites the possibility of 
future change. In short, there is still a future prediction problem at 
the time the court resolves any contract dispute. 
People change their minds both before and after lawsuits. Yet 
courts, hesitant to impose “permanent” consequences based on 
superseded preferences, may make decisions with permanent 
consequences based on preferences that are no less transitory. 
Examples certainly exist of parties who have appeared before the 
courts with certain desires regarding choices of personal 
significance and have subsequently changed their minds. 
A particularly well-known example is Norma McCorvey, the 
“Roe” of Roe v. Wade.137 McCorvey agreed to be a plaintiff in a 
lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Texas’s anti-abortion 
statutes.138 In the complaint, she alleged “that she was unmarried 
and pregnant” and that “she wished to terminate her pregnancy by 
                                                                                                             
 135. Rebecca Dresser relies on this reasoning to question the desirability of 
medical advance directives. See Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided 
Strategy for Securing Death With Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823, 1835 (2003); 
see also Coleman, supra note 58, at 90 (providing a hypothetical scenario 
regarding the disposition of cryopreserved embryos in which a wife who 
formerly elected to donate her remaining embryos finds, after having children 
successfully through the IVF process, that the idea of others raising her children 
would offend her deeply). 
 136. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 22. 
 137. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (limiting the ability of states to prohibit abortion). 
 138. See Joshua Prager, The Accidental Activist, VANITY FAIR, Feb. 2013, at 
113, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2013/02/norma-mccorvey-
roe-v-wade-abortion, archived at http://perma.cc/W2XD-YTJC . 
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an abortion.”139 Between the filing of the complaint and the 
Supreme Court’s decision nearly three years later, she gave birth to 
a child and placed it for adoption, yet she still publicly praised the 
decision.140 For a time in the late 1980s and early 1990s, McCorvey 
continued to advocate in support of abortion rights.141 In 1995, though, 
McCorvey changed her views after experiencing a religious 
conversion, ultimately creating a non-profit organization with the 
purpose of undoing the effects of her previous involvement in the 
reproductive rights movement.142 In 2003, she even filed a motion for 
relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
seeking to revisit the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe.143  
McCorvey’s shift provides anecdotal support for a 
commonsense assumption: if people’s preferences are likely to 
change on certain matters, then they may still change after a legal 
dispute. Proponents of the different selves rationale ignore this 
point. The J.B. court, for example, held that it would not enforce 
prior agreements disposing of cryopreserved embryos because 
“[e]nforcement . . . at some future date in a case where one party 
has reconsidered his or her earlier acquiescence” could force a 
party “to become a biological parent against his or her will.”144 It 
therefore affirmed a lower court decision to destroy the 
embryos.145 What the court failed to recognize is that by having the 
embryos destroyed, it nominally protected the ability to reconsider 
but foreclosed the possibility of future changes of mind: neither 
spouse could thereafter decide to use those embryos to reproduce. 
Nothing in the different selves rationale justifies treating a pre-
dispute change of mind differently from a post-dispute change. If 
our preferences about important matters are likely to change 
throughout our lives so that we cannot be held tomorrow to our 
choices of today, the point of resolution is just an arbitrary 
snapshot. Although there may be legal, procedural reasons for 
differentiating between commitments expressed in a contract and 
commitments made before the court (judicial estoppel, increased 
                                                                                                             
 139. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120. 
 140. Prager, supra note 138, at 113. 
 141. See id. at 114. 
 142. Id. at 115. 
 143. See McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 847 (5th Cir. 2004) (describing the 
procedural history of McCorvey’s action). 
 144. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718 (N.J. 2001). 
 145. See id. at 720. The court left open the possibility that the embryos could 
remain frozen for some additional period of time if J.B. would consent and M.B. 
would pay the storage fees, but it is unclear whether that in fact occurred. See id. 
Moreover, even a period of prolonged storage could not last forever for practical 
reasons including the length of time the fertility clinic agreed to store the 
embryos. 
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formality, etc.), those differences cannot prevent internal changes 
of mind, as McCorvey’s case indicates. Certainly the solemnity of 
the marriage ceremony and the signing of the marriage license do 
not prevent divorce in any measurable way.146 Nor does the value 
of “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family 
life”147 differentiate between pre-dispute and post-dispute changes 
of mind.  
The different selves rationale calls into question the defining 
attributes of contract law: its futurity, its ability to hold parties to 
discarded choices, and its ability to identify preferences to enforce. 
But it raises more questions than it answers: to what choices 
should the different selves rationale apply, and why should the law 
protect the preferences expressed at the time of a legal dispute over 
the preferences expressed at other times? These deficiencies 
suggest that the different selves rationale fails on its own terms. 
III. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS 
As the previous Parts have demonstrated, the different selves 
rationale challenges the legitimacy of holding people responsible 
for commitments made by their earlier selves based on changes of 
preference related to certain highly important decisions. The 
different selves rationale does not appear to go so far as to suggest 
that people are physically discontinuous over time—e.g., that 
differences in their physical bodies cause the later self to be a 
different person—nor does it question some meaningful level of 
psychological connectedness—e.g., shared emotions, memories, or 
preferences.148 It therefore cannot be squared with the theories that 
make up the generic view of personal identity.149 A case could be 
made, however, that the different selves rationale demands a 
heightened standard of identity that accounts for the ability to 
integrate past and present preferences regarding important matters. 
This concern raises questions that sound in the register of an 
emerging theory of personal identity: narrative identity. This Part 
                                                                                                             
 146. Nor does the petitioning of the court for the right to get married, as the 
experience of the named plaintiffs in the landmark Massachusetts marriage 
equality case, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 
(Mass. 2003), indicates. See Michael Levenson, After 2 Years, Same-Sex 
Marriage Icons Split Up, BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 2006 (discussing the split of 
Julie and Hillary Goodridge). 
 147. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (quoting Moore v. E. 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)). 
 148. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra Part I.A. 
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evaluates the validity of the different selves rationale in light of 
that theory. 
A. The Concept of Narrative Identity 
Scholars in various fields have converged on an appreciation of 
the role that narrative plays in the establishment of personal 
identity. Recall the questions that theories of personal identity seek 
to answer: What makes one the person one is? What connects a 
person over time? These questions raise problems of sameness or 
reidentification—whether a thing at Time2 is the same as a thing at 
Time1—and the challenge of characterization—what makes one 
the person one is.150 The answers to these questions support the 
attribution of responsibility or compensation for past actions and 
justify self-interested concern about the future.151 Paul Ricoeur has 
suggested that people have an “intuitive pre-understanding” of the 
role that narrative plays in answering these questions: “do not 
human lives become more readable [lisibles] when they are 
interpreted in function of the stories people tell about themselves? 
And these ‘life stories,’ are they not rendered more intelligible 
when they are applied to narrative models—plots—borrowed from 
history and fiction (drama or novels)?”152  
Proponents in the fields of philosophy and psychology largely 
agree on the defining aspects of narrative identity.153 At its core, 
narrative identity is self-constitutive. A leading proponent in 
philosophy, Marya Schechtman, has argued that “a person creates 
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Part II.A.1. DeGrazia, for example, argues that the concept of narrative identity 
cannot explain why a person may continue to exist even in the absence of a 
narrative identity (e.g., in a vegetative state) or why narrative identity cannot 
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DEGRAZIA, supra note 33, at 79–80, 114.  
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his identity by forming an autobiographical narrative—a story of 
his life.”154 “[I]ndividuals constitute themselves as persons by 
coming to think of themselves as persisting subjects who have had 
experience in the past and will continue to have experience in the 
future, taking certain experiences as theirs.”155 The inclusion of 
traits, actions, and experiences into the self-narrative become the 
person’s “by virtue of that inclusion.”156 This self-constitutive 
approach to identity explains why a person can take responsibility 
for past acts or steps in her future self-interest: a person’s identity 
is hers “because she acknowledges her personhood and 
appropriates certain actions and experiences as her own.”157 
The narrative form helps a person “make sense of meanings 
that unfold in and through time.”158 A person is likely to 
experience a “wide range of different, and likely conflicting, roles 
that characterize a given life in the here and now,” as well as 
contrasts that occur over time.159 One’s personal identity must 
integrate both types of contrasts, a process that is not always neat 
or easy.160 
The narrative form plays an important role in providing 
coherence. According to Schechtman, “[p]erhaps the most salient 
feature of the narrative form in general is that the individual 
incidents and episodes in the narrative take their meaning from the 
broader context of the story in which they occur.”161 Under this 
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 161. Id. at 96. 
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view, no particular time-slice of a life is fully intelligible on its 
own. Schechtman suggests that narrative identity depends on the 
existence of a “plot” or “story” that allows a person to have a self-
conception as a “well-defined character.”162 Psychologists have noted 
that the reliance on stories is part of the developmental process during 
which a child becomes an adult. It is at adolescence when a person 
realizes that “one’s life, as complex and dynamic as it increasingly 
appears to be, might be integrated into a meaningful and purposeful 
whole.”163 Because “[i]n virtually all intelligible stories, humans or 
humanlike characters act to accomplish intentions, generating a 
sequence of actions and reactions extended as a plot in time,” these 
stories are particularly useful to adolescents struggling to arrange 
“potentially discordant and unrelated aspects of selfhood into a 
purposeful psychosocial configuration.”164 
The reliance on plot, which inherently depends to an extent on 
inherited or provided stories, raises additional concerns. The 
existence of narrative identity, however, and the value of the 
purposes it serves, are difficult to refute. 
People generally seek self-continuity. A coherent sense of self 
is thought to be healthy from a psychological point of view. It is 
related to higher levels of self-esteem, positive affect, and 
authenticity, and to lower levels of depression or negative affect.165 
The absence of self-continuity is “the hallmark of some forms of 
psychopathology, particularly some personality disorders,” and is 
linked to an increased risk of suicide.166 Considering the extreme 
case of an individual without any narrative self-conception “whose 
sentience is focused always on the present and never extends . . . to the 
past or future,” Schechtman concludes that such a life would be so 
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different from the “kind of life led by the rest of us” as to render the 
individual a non-person.167 The foregoing sources suggest a consensus 
that self-continuity is generally desirable regardless of whether one 
takes so strong a view about what makes one a person.168 
Self-continuity is also a prerequisite for self-regarding behavior. 
As David DeGrazia has observed, “[f]rom the standpoint of the 
present, we would like to be able to anticipate having experiences and 
performing actions, not just accept the promise that we will, in fact, 
experience and act. Put another way, we want to be able to identify 
with the future subject-agent, regarding her subjectivity as a 
continuation of our own.”169 Various aspects of the narrative process 
facilitate this orientation to future goals. Psychologists have noted the 
role of autobiographical memory in locating and defining the self 
within an ongoing life story that has future implications.170 The 
narrative process allows a person to consider the relationship of past 
events to valued ends, to place them in temporal or sequential order, 
and to give those relevant events meaning based on the status of the 
goal (triumph, failure, etc.).171 Coherence and constancy also 
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enable a person to coordinate with others to achieve shared goals 
and to carry out activities that extend over a long period of time.172 
Anticipation of the future affects a person’s present experience 
in at least two senses. First, expectations of future pleasure or pain 
actually bring about related emotional experiences in the 
present.173 Thinking about a future painful experience (such as 
rejection from graduate school) brings about current discomfort. 
Additionally, because a person’s actual future will bring about 
certain expected experiences, a person will be motivated to take 
certain responsible actions (like studying for a test).174 By 
connecting the present self with the expected future, narrative 
actually shapes the present by engendering concern with the 
narrative as a whole.175 The belief that the life is a narrative whole 
therefore grounds concepts of moral agency by facilitating future-
regarding action and allowing a person to situate it within his own 
self-narrative. And it grounds concepts of moral responsibility by 
placing both the person who committed an action and the person 
experiencing its consequences within the same narrative.176  
In sum, the concept of narrative identity is useful because it 
accords with how most people understand personal identity as a 
descriptive matter and explains how the self mediates between past 
experiences and future goals. By providing an account of how the 
selves connect—through a person’s own agency—narrative 
identity also justifies the imposition of punishments and rewards as 
well as paternalistic interventions, both by the self and by the state 
(such as saving for retirement or discouraging smoking).  
B. How Narrative Identity Theory Undermines the Different 
Selves Rationale 
Narrative identity theory addresses the primary concerns raised 
by the different selves rationale and offers support for the 
enforcement of agreements.  
The argument here proceeds in three parts. First, I demonstrate 
that concerns about the identities or the “selves” of a party to a 
contractual dispute do not justify non-enforcement of agreements. 
Second, I argue that the future-regarding and self-constituting 
aspects of narrative identity suggest that people should generally 
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108 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
be held to the consequences of their choices. Third, I comment on 
the limits of the narrative identity theory in the contract context. 
1. Concerns About Differences Between the Selves Should Not 
Normally Relieve Parties of Their Contractual Commitments 
At this point, it is useful to restate the leading arguments 
against the enforcement of prior commitments based on concerns 
about personal identity. Kronman speculated that a promisor’s 
goals might sometimes change so substantially that his previous 
decisions would now seem irrational and foreign to him.177 The 
inability to understand his previous choice would render it 
“demoralizing” and cause him to lose “confidence in his ability to 
make lasting commitments.”178 Building on Kronman’s theory, 
Coleman suggested that decisions regarding the use of assisted 
reproductive technologies could seem like those of a “completely 
different person” at the time of a subsequent contract dispute due 
to intervening life changes.179 He argued that choices related to 
reproduction or familial relationships would be subject to change, 
such that they should remain inalienable.180 Courts have sometimes 
adopted these views, deciding that a person should not be able to 
bind his future self on matters of personal importance.181 The 
narrative identity theory addresses the assumptions inherent in 
these arguments.  
a. Against the Discontinuity Assumption 
First, the narrative identity theory suggests that assumptions 
about discontinuity are descriptively false, at least in the 
presumably healthy individuals that normally enter into 
agreements. The maintenance of a sense of personal continuity “is 
crucial to psychological adaptation throughout the life course” so 
much so that its absence is “the hallmark of some forms of 
psychopathology.”182 Most people appear to strive toward self-
continuity and integrate even significant goal changes within their 
narrative identities, e.g., “‘I was a born-again Christian, but these 
days I feel I am an agnostic.’”183 Of course, new experiences can 
                                                                                                             
 177. See Kronman, supra note 46, at 780–82. 
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 179. See Coleman, supra note 58, at 91. 
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cause a person to revise her self-narrative, but that experience is 
usually processed through the narrative instead of externally to 
it.184 This characteristic suggests that people are likely to view 
even painful experiences as their own. 
It is true that some individuals lack the ability to form a 
coherent self-narrative because of incapacity or illness. Infants, for 
example, lack the cognitive abilities necessary to conceive of 
themselves as distinct individuals persisting through time.185 
People suffering from severe dementia or Alzheimer’s disease 
might also lose their access to a narrative identity because their 
consciousness “cannot be pulled together in a coherent whole.”186 
Serious dissociative disorders such as dissociative identity disorder 
(previously described as multiple personality disorder), in which 
an individual has at least two distinct and relatively-enduring 
identities or personality states, may also prevent an individual from 
crafting a coherent self-narrative.187 Even less pathological 
dissociative symptoms associated with posttraumatic stress 
disorder or childhood abuse may interfere with a person’s self-
narrative to some extent.188 These conditions could very well 
prevent people from remembering, understanding, or identifying 
with a past choice.  
A few researchers have studied the possibility that even people 
who do not suffer from pathological dissociation might nonetheless 
experience a certain “sense of discontinuity of the self across 
time.”189 These studies, however, reveal that even though some 
individuals feel less of a connection to the past, they still remember 
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it.190 And they still appear to understand that past within the 
framework of a continuous story. As an example of someone 
experiencing “diachronic disunity,” the authors of one study 
provide the following statement from a subject: 
I feel that I am not the same person I was five years ago, 
because I have changed spiritually. I am now a Christian, 
and I look at life completely differently from the way I did 
five years ago before I was saved. Because of my faith in 
Christ I no longer worry like I used to. I do not get stressed 
out as much. I do not get offended like I used to either.191 
This statement adopts a narrative perspective that draws on 
experiences in the past to make sense of the present. The speaker 
does not only refer to his or her current state (a Christian) but 
recognizes “change[]” and “differen[ce].” The speaker perceives 
the experience of being “saved” as having brought about 
developments in his or her personality that the speaker perceives to 
be beneficial. It seems clear, therefore, that regardless of the fact 
that the speaker self-identifies as a different person, he or she 
exhibits the characteristics of continuity that support the existence 
of a unified narrative identity. 
Underlying the different selves rationale is a misplaced 
assumption about the impact of improvident decisions. Adherents 
to that position worry about the harm to a current self brought 
about by a prior bad decision. What the literature on narrative 
identity suggests, though, is that in addition to providing unity, the 
narrative process is adaptive. That is, it prevents previous decisions 
from sticking out like a foreign element in a person’s life. 
Although some psychologists have recognized that certain 
experiences may best be characterized as a foreign element, for 
example, as a result of trauma192 or because society suppresses 
dialogue regarding those experiences,193 they are the rare exception 
and can—and perhaps should—be recognized as such. Suffice it to 
say that most contract disputes do not involve choices of that sort. 
Support for the concept of a narrative identity therefore strikes at 
                                                                                                             
 190. Id. at 249. 
 191. Id. at 237. 
 192. See, e.g., Sarah L. Halligan et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Following Assault: The Role of Cognitive Processing, Trauma Memory, and 
Appraisals, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 419, 419 (2003) 
(discussing the effects of a traumatic experience on the self-narrative). 
 193. See Robyn Fivush, The Silenced Self: Constructing Self from Memories 
Spoken and Unspoken, in THE SELF AND MEMORY 75, 75 (Denise R. Beike, 
James M. Lampinen, & Douglas A. Behrend eds., 2004) (discussing the 
silencing of sexual abuse and its effect on the self-narrative). 
2014] BINDING FUTURE SELVES 111 
 
 
 
the core of the different selves rationale, namely the suggestion 
that there are substantially different selves at play in contracting 
situations. 
b. Against the Assumption of Limits on Future-Regarding 
Choice  
Second, the narrative identity theory suggests that people can 
make future-regarding choices in the service of their goals on a 
range of matters and that it is possible to deliberate about how 
those choices will affect their future selves. An implication of 
Coleman’s position that any number of intervening events will 
render reproductive decisions obsolete is that a person cannot 
adequately look out for her future self in that regard. But, as 
proponents of a narrative identity theory make clear, self-
continuity satisfies the present desire for our lives “to continue to 
unfold and include . . . future actions and experiences.”194 Nothing 
in the literature suggests that conscious choices about intimate 
matters that people memorialize in agreements are less bound up in 
expectations about the future or result from different decision-
making processes. 
c. Against Privileging the Time2 Self 
Moreover, the concept of narrative identity reveals the extent to 
which courts adopting the different selves rationale privilege the 
later self without any legitimate basis for doing so. When courts 
and commentators refer to changed or later selves, or problems 
with self-binding, they do not remain neutral but side with the self 
that appears before the court in the actual dispute.195 What the 
narrative framework makes clear, though, is the extent to which 
this decision rests on illusions of narrative authority. Recall that 
the different selves rationale could not justify why a court should 
impose final consequences based on preferences that had already 
changed but might logically change again at some later time.196 
The literature on narrative identity explains why this is the case. A 
person constructs a narrative identity to make sense of the 
experiences and events in one’s life. The self-narrative may be 
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relatively stable, but even the goals around which the narrative is 
oriented can change.197  
Because the end goals can change over time, there is no 
objective standard by which to assess the validity of any given 
action or preference. When a person creates her self-narrative, she 
does so only from a position of limited authority because she does 
not know how her story will ultimately unfold. Interestingly, 
multiple researchers have observed differences between older and 
younger adults that reflect this reality.198 Although change is still 
possible, older adults, with less of their lives to look forward to and 
more important decisions in the rearview mirror, “have a well-
defined sense of self that shows remarkable stability and 
resiliency.”199 Younger adults, in contrast, experience more 
uncertainty regarding the extent to which they have changed and 
spend more time reinterpreting old events in light of newer 
experiences.200 One can infer that closer proximity to the end of the 
life story provides more interpretive certainty regarding its 
component parts. 
This subjectivity has not been lost on literary critics who study 
the narrative form. It is only in light of known ends that we can 
make final judgments about the significance of particular 
occurrences. Peter Brooks has observed that: 
[N]arratives work back from their ends, which are the real 
determinants of their vectors, the direction and intention of 
their plotting. . . . [A] large part of [a narrative’s] coherence 
derives from the knowledge that an end lies in wait, to 
complete and elucidate whatever is put in motion at the 
start.201 
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In other words, we can only be sure whether actions were on the 
whole “good” or “bad,” or reflective of the person’s “true” 
interests at the end. “[H]ow can we condemn something that is 
ephemeral, in transit?,” Milan Kundera has asked.202 “In the sunset 
of dissolution, everything is illuminated by the aura of nostalgia, 
even the guillotine.”203  
The lack of authority may not be apparent to a particular person 
at a particular time because of the person’s ability to modify her self-
narrative to suit her developing needs. Philosophers and psychologists 
alike believe that people can and do craft their narratives in the 
absence of perfect finality.204 The legal system, however, struggles 
with this lack of authority because it seeks to resolve disputes at a 
particular moment. It struggles to impose “truth” upon a moving target 
whose movements might render a judicial decision obsolete.  
Preoccupied as it is with the concept of final ends, the law has 
imposed finality where it might not otherwise exist. As an 
example, Brooks points to the “inevitable discovery” exception to 
the exclusionary rule articulated in Nix v. Williams.205 In that case, 
the criminal defendant guided law enforcement to the body of his 
victim after a detective gave a “Christian burial speech” in 
violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.206 
The Court reasoned that the body was within the area that would 
have been searched, had the search not been called off because of 
the defendant’s actions, and would therefore have been found 
independently.207 But as Brooks points out, the Court’s doctrine of 
inevitable discovery “clearly starts from the end of the trail of the 
search—at the dead body—and then traces the path, be it 
inevitable or merely probable, that would have led to it.”208 We see 
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the Court crafting its narrative in light of a known end begotten 
through admittedly illegitimate means. The case method 
introduced at Harvard Law School by C.C. Langdell provides 
another example of “retrospective prophecy” in the law.209 
Standing at the point of the outcome, the decision in a particular 
case, “[t]he point of the exercise, in a pedagogical and cognitive 
sense, is to retrace how that outcome was inevitable from the ‘facts 
of the case.’”210 Satisfaction comes from understanding, based on 
the known ending, that “it had to be this way and no other way.”211 
In short, courts and commentators have resisted this indeterminacy 
by treating current preferences as fixed and resolving the dispute in 
light of those preferences. They assume an end, ultimately true or not, 
and work back from there. 
Not only does this retrospective approach shift attention away 
from the context of the dispute in an ongoing narrative, but it also 
begins from the starting point of the party’s changed preference rather 
than asking, in the first instance, whether the choice was problematic 
at the time it was made. Courts adopting the different selves rationale, 
for example, have framed the inquiry in terms of whether it would be 
permissible to enforce an agreement over a party’s later objection.212 
They explicitly look backwards from the party’s current preference. 
Typically, courts considering most contract disputes focus on the 
parties’ circumstances and understandings during the contract 
formation process.213 The different selves rationale skips the question 
whether the choice was properly made, substituting categorical 
limitations on the party’s power to agree. In Witten, for example, the 
court, relying on Coleman’s argument that it may “be impossible” to 
make advance “decisions about intensely emotional matters, where 
people act more on the basis of feeling and instinct than rational 
deliberation,”214 adopted a rule against enforcing decisions involving 
marriage and family relationships.215 From the court’s perspective as 
                                                                                                             
 209. See id. at 134. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Iowa 2003) 
(“[A]re prior agreements regarding the future disposition of embryos 
enforceable when one of the donors is no longer comfortable with his or her 
prior decision?”); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718 (N.J. 2001) (asking whether 
“[e]nforcement of a contract that would allow the implantation of preembryos at 
some future date in a case where one party has reconsidered his or her earlier 
acquiescence” would be permissible). 
 213. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
 214. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 215. See id. at 781. Nancy Kim has criticized this decision on different 
grounds, arguing that the court improperly failed to consider gender-related 
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the arbiter of a present dispute, this conclusion may sound reasonable. 
But it bypasses an inquiry into the actual circumstances of the 
contracting process, instead assuming that the agreement resulted from 
these deficiencies. This type of reasoning diminishes individual choice 
on matters of personal importance by foreclosing the possibility of 
responsible and rational decision-making without even looking at the 
circumstances in which the agreement was made.216 
d. Summary 
At bottom, narrative identity theory demonstrates the 
weaknesses of the assumptions underlying the different selves 
rationale. It posits that personal identity is more continuous than it 
is discontinuous, that it adapts to and incorporates difficult 
experiences instead of alienating them, and that it continually 
develops rather than remaining fixed in time. It further explains 
why judicial interventions based on later, but not final, preferences 
are unjustified. 
2. The Future-Oriented Aspect of Narrative Identity Weighs in 
Favor of Enforcing Agreements 
One might argue that even if the theory of narrative identity shows 
that the different selves rationale is wrong, it offers only a weak 
argument, if anything, in support of contract enforcement. In this 
section, I take on that argument and show that the future-regarding 
                                                                                                             
 
factors that should have recognized and protected the wife’s detrimental 
reliance. Nancy S. Kim, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context, 45 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 660–68 (2010). Although her prescribed solution—
recognizing a claim for promissory estoppel—differs from my own, she also 
calls attention to the court’s misplaced emphasis on the self at the time of 
adjudication rather than the selves at the time of contracting. See id. at 660–68. 
 216. The retrospective framework used by the Witten court echoes the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in its decision upholding the Federal ban on partial-
birth abortions, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). There, the Court did 
not focus on whether a woman could prospectively make an informed decision 
to use one of the banned abortion procedures. Rather, it assumed that some 
women would make uninformed decisions without the law. Upon learning more 
about the banned procedures, those women would “struggle with grief more 
anguished and sorrow more profound when she learn[ed], only after the event, 
what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and 
vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child . . . .” Id. at 159–60. 
Reasoning backwards from this hypothetical situation, the Court inferred that 
the regulation might “encourage some women to carry the infant to full term” or 
might encourage the medical profession to “find different and less shocking 
methods to abort the fetus in the second trimester.” Id. at 160.  
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aspect of personal identity is a valuable concept threatened by the 
different selves rationale and vindicated by narrative identity. 
People value their connection to their future selves. Continuity 
allows people to “pursue longer-term projects that [they] value and 
to become the sorts of people [they] want to be.”217 As discussed 
above, people not only derive pleasure (and pain) from considering 
themselves in a future state, but they also benefit from their 
connection to their future selves by taking self-regarding actions 
that they believe will improve their position.218 These benefits 
inure to both people and the society in which they live. These 
values are well established and seemingly beyond debate—few 
would argue for a policy that explicitly prevents people from 
taking actions in their future self-interest. Indeed, many public 
policies, like individual retirement accounts and nutritional 
labeling, aim to increase future-regarding action.  
The connection of a person to her future self justifies the 
apportionment of reward and punishment. This feature benefits 
society by justifying socially beneficial institutions: much of the 
law, for instance, is concerned with imposing consequences for 
past actions.219 But punishment does not only depend on a 
connection between the present and the past but also between the 
present and future. As Steven Knapp has explained, punishment 
requires a strong identity-relation between the person and the act 
for which she is being punished:220  
The question . . . is whether it makes sense to treat a person 
existing in the present as still the appropriate object of 
attitudes appropriate to an action she performed in the past. 
Taken seriously, this can only mean thinking of her as still 
performing the act in question. For unless she is thought of 
as still performing the act, . . . she no longer has any control 
over the act’s occurring or not occurring; she has no more 
power over it than anyone else.221 
                                                                                                             
 217. DEGRAZIA, supra note 33, at 82. 
 218. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text. 
 219. Posner provides the examples of contract and criminal law, but this 
argument applies as well to most of the law governing the legal relations 
between persons. See Posner, supra note 43, at 34. 
 220. There are a few exceptions to this general rule, such as when the law 
holds a person vicariously liable for the acts of another. I thank Dick Craswell 
for bringing this point to my attention. 
 221. Steven Knapp, Collective Memory and the Actual Past, 26 
REPRESENTATIONS 123, 136 (1989). 
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A person cannot literally continue to perform an act that has 
already occurred. Identification with one’s action, therefore, 
supplies the identity-relation: 
We punish [people] in order to make them identify with the 
act in a way that will constitute their taking responsibility 
for it. . . . [B]eing responsible in this sense precisely means 
having a disposition to identify with one’s own actual past, 
to think of oneself as inseparably bound to it, even as if one 
were presently performing one’s past acts and therefore 
appropriately liable, in the present, to the experience of 
aversion that should have accompanied the bad ones or the 
experience of pleasure that should have accompanied the 
good ones. . . . We want to cause people . . . to anticipate 
that they will be unable to deny their identity with the 
selves they are when they commit whatever crime they 
contemplate committing.222 
As Knapp explains, self-regarding action depends on a person’s 
ability to take seriously the effect her actions will have on her 
future self. This indirect form of behavioral control suffers from 
the fact that both the past and the future are particularly weak 
constituencies in the present. Narrative identity helps to improve 
this process by bridging the past and future. The justification of 
punishment and reward in turn benefits the individual by making 
her world seem less irrational: “Whereas it seems right to reward 
virtuous action with something that is pleasant to the virtuous 
subject, it also seems right to detract from the ill-gotten pleasures 
of the vicious subject.”223 
Moreover, as Jeremy Waldron has pointed out, the legal system 
depends to a large degree on the ability and willingness of people 
to “apply[] officially promulgated norms to their own conduct, 
rather than waiting for coercive intervention from the state.”224 For 
this feature to work, people must be viewed as having the ability to 
act on behalf of their future selves.  
To the extent that narrative identity theory facilitates the 
foregoing societal benefits, departure from that paradigm should 
not occur thoughtlessly. Still, it is a bit more difficult to value the 
individual harms caused by the different selves rationale. The harm 
to the party who relied on the agreement or performed to her 
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detriment is clear enough: her expectations regarding matters of 
importance would be defeated and she might have suffered 
inconvenience or cost in the process. The harm to the other party 
would be more difficult to quantify. One could argue, for instance, 
that a judicial proclamation that a person could not make a 
particular decision in his best interest on a matter of great personal 
importance225 might be demoralizing. Such a decision would also 
deny the person’s agency with respect to that choice.226 Finally, it 
might interfere with the person’s motivation or ability to integrate 
that experience into his coherent self-narrative.227 Those arguments 
should be met with skepticism, however. It seems that narrative 
identity is a resilient concept capable of justifying a person’s self-
interested requests of the court. And it is doubtful that any of the 
parties advocating a different selves rationale feel a loss of self-
respect as a result of the litigation position that they adopted.228 
Nonetheless, the different selves rationale causes harm to 
individuals invoking it by restricting their freedom based on an 
impoverished conception of personal identity. The defining aspect 
of narrative identity as laid out in the numerous sources cited in 
this Article is that of self-constitution: people control their 
identities by including traits, actions, and experiences into their 
self-narrative and giving them meaning through the narrative 
process.229 This view of personal identity accords with the notion 
of dignity as a status-concept recognizing a person’s “ability to 
control and regulate her actions in accordance with her own 
apprehension of norms and reasons that apply to her,” and 
assuming her capability “to give an account of herself . . . that 
others are to pay attention to.”230 The dual aspects of authority over 
oneself and recognition of that authority by the state informed 
Justice Kennedy’s pervasive use of the term “dignity” in the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision invalidating a portion of the 
                                                                                                             
 225. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988) (stating that a 
surrogate mother “never makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite 
clearly any decision prior to the baby’s birth is, in the most important sense, 
uninformed”). 
 226. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 32, at 159 (noting that the “inclusion of a 
particular action in a person’s self-narrative situates it in his life in such a way 
that he has agency with respect to it”). 
 227. See id.  
 228. Because I assume the lack of support for the notion that a person will 
suffer harm as a result of the different selves rationale, any future empirical 
work will most likely strengthen as opposed to undermine my argument in this 
section. 
 229. See supra notes 154–157 and accompanying text. 
 230. Waldron, supra note 224, at 3. 
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Defense of Marriage Act.231 Discussing the marital relation, Justice 
Kennedy observed that “[r]esponsibilities, as well as rights, 
enhance the dignity and integrity of the person.”232 To Justice 
Kennedy, the “recognition” by some states of same-sex unions as 
marriages “conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense 
import.”233 By imposing “restrictions and disabilities” on that 
state-provided status, the federal government subjected married 
same-sex couples to “indignity”—depriving those couples of the 
recognition—and rights and responsibilities—that the states sought 
to provide.234  
The different selves rationale embodies skepticism about a 
person’s ability to make binding commitments and, as a result, 
affords people less dignity than that to which they are entitled. 
Variants of the different selves rationale have been used to 
invalidate agreements pertaining to surrogacy,235 embryo 
disposition,236 and childrearing237 on the ground that it would be 
improper to compel a person to perform certain acts against his 
will, i.e., to a promise made by another version of himself with no 
authority to bind him. It does not take much imagination to see 
how the same rationale would apply to numerous other 
arrangements. Sperm donor agreements provide one example. 
Many of these agreements require donors and recipients to make 
long-term commitments to fertility clinics concerning the same 
types of “intimate” subject matter involved in the cases cited 
above. Donors, for example, may agree to provide sperm on the 
condition that their identity will be kept strictly confidential; other 
donors may agree to be contacted by their genetically related 
children at some later time.238 At stake in these agreements are the 
fathers’ and children’s rights to know or not know genetically 
related family members and potentially to establish or refuse to 
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 232. Id. at 2694. 
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establish a family connection with them.239 In such a situation, a 
person could attempt to have his contemporaneous preference 
honored so as to defeat the expectations of the other party.  
The irony, of course, is that by treating people’s choices as 
subject to change and refusing to impose consequences for them, 
the proponents of a different selves rationale undermine the dignity 
of the committing parties in the very realm of the law in which 
dignity is arguably most essential. Moreover, as demonstrated 
above, the reasons to confine the view to intimate agreements are 
very thin.240 
A more fully considered understanding of personal identity 
therefore suggests that holding people to their commitments 
actually benefits rather than harms them. Personal identity offers a 
reason to enforce agreements rather than a reason not to. 
3. Limits of the Narrative Identity Theory 
To be clear, this Article does not claim that the theory of 
narrative identity justifies the enforcement of all intimate agreements. 
For instance, traditional defenses to contract formation or enforcement 
raise independent reasons (going to defects in the bargaining process, 
unconscionable terms, etc.) for not enforcing agreements. Depending 
on how they are drafted, embryo disposition agreements, for example, 
might fail to anticipate changes in circumstances that justify relief 
from the terms of the agreement.241 Moreover, courts may face 
limitations on the remedies they are able to provide. Even if a 
gestational surrogacy agreement were enforceable, for example, a 
court might not be able to order specific performance of a provision 
requiring the gestational surrogate to abort or refrain from aborting 
the fetus.242 The self-protective aspect of the different selves 
                                                                                                             
 239. See Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 392–94 (2012); 
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(involving an attempt by a user of anonymous sperm to obtain personal 
information of a donor whose identity a fertility clinic agreed to keep 
anonymous). 
 240. See supra Part III.A. 
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rationale is simply an illegitimate basis not to enforce an otherwise 
binding agreement. 
I am also sensitive to the concern that society’s dominant 
narratives might lead people to commitments that are not truly 
their own or are problematic because their burdens fall more 
heavily on certain classes of people. From an early age, for 
example, girls are taught to give voice to the emotional aspects of 
their personal experiences to a much greater extent than boys, 
which affects the way both women and men engage in their 
activities and understand their experiences.243 It is therefore 
possible that certain decisions—e.g., to spend more time at home 
or to view oneself as a breadwinner—could be determined by these 
inherited narratives. The fact that societal narratives might 
privilege certain groups over others raises concerns when a person 
from a disadvantaged group makes a choice that we perceive to 
disadvantage him. 
This concern is difficult to deny but also difficult to value. 
First, it would be challenging to separate out pernicious influences 
from benign ones. Is one’s choice of self-narrative more heavily 
influenced by gendered scripts or by the individual interactions 
that person had with his parents? Second, it is difficult to 
determine with confidence whether a person’s choice of self-
narrative was actually influenced by these external scripts instead 
of any number of external circumstances, like past experiences that 
are unique to every person. Third, as discussed above, self-
narratives are more or less valuable to a person based on their 
coherence, not their objective content. The fact that one’s choices 
reflect dominant societal narratives would not seem to affect the 
ability of a person to craft a more or less coherent self-narrative. 
Finally, the deterministic view “flies in the face of both 
phenomenology, which suggests to each of us . . . that she can 
change herself or her life direction to some extent, and everyday 
social observation, which suggests that other people sometimes 
manage such self-changes.”244 As DeGrazia has noted, even 
though all of us live within constraints stemming from our genetic 
makeup or past experiences, “our choices and efforts often play a 
significant role in determining what we do and become.”245 
Though preferences influenced by socialization may seem less than 
fully autonomous, it is often the case that a person would be 
inclined to identify with those preferences either dispositionally or 
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upon conscious reflection.246 And presumably, upon reflection, a 
person could explain and integrate a change of preference into his 
ongoing self-narrative. 
It is therefore unconvincing that some degree of determinism 
lessens the usefulness of the narrative identity concept. If that 
person views certain decisions as belonging to her self-narrative, 
our external skepticism will have little to say about her narrative 
identity and cannot defeat the purposes that narrative identity 
serves for her.247 
CONCLUSION 
Many parties find themselves experiencing a change of heart after 
entering into a binding agreement. When individuals enter into 
agreements concerning choices that they deem significant—whether 
pertaining to intimate matters or resulting in other types of opportunity 
costs—they may experience strong regret or demoralization over their 
previous decision. This Article has considered whether changes of 
mind regarding intimate subject matter ever justify relieving a person 
of his or her earlier commitments. 
The rise of personal identity as a matter of concern in the law 
of contracts has its roots in two parallel legal developments:248 the 
increased recognition of freedom from state interference in the 
realm of sex, reproduction, and family relationships even outside 
the status of marriage;249 and the trend toward privatization in 
family law.250 Both developments privilege the rights of 
individuals to make personal decisions long deemed significant in 
the law and in society. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,251 the Court 
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recognized a “right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.”252 Thirty years later, in Lawrence v. Texas,253 the 
Court framed that concept even more broadly, stating that the right 
to liberty—which “presumes an autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct”254—prevented states from criminalizing consensual 
homosexual sodomy between adults.255 As a result of these and 
related decisions, choices once subsumed in the status of marriage, 
such as those pertaining to sex and procreation, have become 
available to individuals both in and outside of marriage. 
Meanwhile, courts that had once refused to recognize any 
private agreement that could undermine the status of marriage, 
either by changing its duties, encouraging its dissolution, or 
recognizing alternative arrangements like cohabitation,256 began to 
enforce agreements between cohabitants and between spouses that 
governed the exit from marriages.257 Around the time of these 
developments, scholars began to devote more attention to the ways 
in which private ordering could secure some of the rights and 
choices previously covered by marital status.258 Greater 
enforcement of private agreements in the courts led many scholars 
generally to conclude that few state-prescribed marital obligations 
remained that could not be altered by the parties, and that “private 
norm creation and private decision making ha[d] supplanted state-
imposed rules and structures for governing family-related 
behavior.”259 Now that people were free to make choices that were 
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previously forbidden, contract, it would seem, would be a natural 
partner in giving effect to those choices. 
But as I and others have argued, rumors of the marital status 
regime’s demise are greatly exaggerated. Although agreements 
regarding the disposition of property, like prenuptial agreements, 
are widely enforced, agreements involving sexual reproduction, 
child rearing, and spousal duties within an ongoing marriage are 
often not enforced.260 It is no accident that concerns about identity 
have arisen within the context of intimate agreements. Courts and 
commentators have long struggled to understand how to reconcile 
individual decision-making in this realm with the entrenched status 
regimes from which those choices emerged. In other words, it is 
difficult to determine whether certain choices—like the right to 
decide whether to reproduce—should be treated as inalienable 
because they are inherently special or because they were 
historically treated as outside the power of a person to make. Part 
II of this Article concluded that the reasons commonly thought to 
support differing treatment do not do so and that concerns about 
personal identity cannot relieve a person of these commitments. In 
short, the liberty to make a range of constitutionally protected 
decisions does not prevent a person from binding herself to her 
decisions. Although there may be other remaining reasons not to 
enforce certain types of intimate agreements, this Article strongly 
argues that the “centrality of certain choices to personhood” 
argument is not sufficient.  
Paying closer attention to personal identity does not only offer 
benefits within the context of intimate agreements. Narrative 
identity also underlies the concept of moral agency, which makes it 
relevant to aspects of contract doctrine that can be justified with 
respect to it. The incapacity defense to contract formation, for 
example, lacks a coherent explanation. The origins and current 
justifications for the prohibition against enforcing a contract 
against infants are far from clear.261 The defense based on mental 
                                                                                                             
 260. See Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 225, 227 (2011) (noting the reluctance of courts to 
enforce contracts in an ongoing marriage); Matsumura, supra note 20, at 191–
94; Katherine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 
NW. U. L. REV. 65, 67 (1998) (noting that when parties to a marriage include 
terms governing housework, sex, emotional support, and other non-financial 
responsibilities in an agreement, “courts only enforce the provisions governing 
money”). 
 261. At common law, individuals under age twenty-one could only incur 
voidable contractual duties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 
cmt. a (1981). The coherent justification for this prohibition is difficult to find. 
Modern scholars have generally explained a minor’s lack of contractual capacity 
on the ground that below a certain age, minors lack maturity, competence, or the 
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illness also admits a wide range of disparate proof.262 Because the 
concept of narrative identity explains why it is morally problematic 
to hold someone accountable for actions that the person is 
incapable of placing within her self-narrative, it can help to 
provide that doctrine with greater coherence.  
Finally, the concept of narrative identity helps to focus 
attention on the positive role that contract law plays in facilitating 
the formation of the self. Margaret Jane Radin has argued that the 
expectation of continuing control over property can enhance 
personhood in the following respect: “If an object you now control 
is bound up in your future plans or in your anticipation of your 
future self, and it is partly these plans for your own continuity that 
make you a person, then your personhood depends on the 
realization of these expectations.”263 Expectations of oneself and 
others regarding future action also allow people to set goals and 
establish connections to their future selves. Although the benefits 
of contracting are often described only in economic or market 
terms, contracts, just like property ownership, can reflect important 
personal commitments that affect a person’s sense of self and the 
quality of his or her self-narrative. 
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